The objective of my project is to explain: why and how the U.S. of 1992, the winner of the Cold War is willing for the first time to be involved in an external crisis in which she does not have a direct national interest.
By doing so, I will focus first of all on how American political apparatus as whole, that includes Congress, Senate (the Senate-Committee on Africa), State Department (Africa Bureau), Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of State, USAID, Pentagon, public media, divers interest and lobby groups, organized itself during the very beginning of post Cold War era in order to respond to the Somali Crisis, the worst humanitarian catastrophe during that time.
My search will then focus on an individual level, that is President Bush. Based upon my search, I believe the chaotic situation of Somalia between 1991 and 1992, which coincide with American presidential election is a case of extreme dilemma for President Bush. In addition of being criticized for unwilling to risk a single military causality in an election year and racism by the public media, he is also facing an increasing pressure for action from both the Senate and Congress, notably from Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas). I.E., by the end of the second congressional session (Dec. 1992), a total of seven hearings have been held on Somalia. However, it is in my belief that the decision of President Bush has much to do with his personal feelings during that precise moment. In addition of his own unforgettable experience at a feeding center for severely malnourished children in Sudan, during the Sahelian famine of the mid-1980s, president Bush in 1992 has lost his dear mother and presidency. Furthermore, I believe president Bush was also concerned at that time about the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world, the utility and limitations of force, the role of moral concerns in U.S. foreign policy, the duty of the international community toward human rights and the administration’s own place in history.
Hence my overall objective is a demonstration of why and how the U.S. is for the first time in her diplomatic history willing to help another nation that she has absolutely no direst strategic interest. And to elucidate on why I believe President Bush’s final decision is rather about his vision of a New World Order and new direction for international diplomacy, that is the prevention of collapse of states and its’ restoration.
 
 

Introduction The Horn of Africa has been the scene of devastating humanitarian crisis for decades; and Somalia, the Africa’s only nation state de facto is a concrete example. Drought and famine, regional and internal war, military coup and authoritarian regime have made this once stable state of the Horn to crumple. However, although the main reason of Somali society’s decadence, the autocratic regime of Muhammad Siad Barre finally collapsed in January 1991, the degree of Somali Crisis was actually increased. The data from various organizations show that from the time when Barre’s regime in Mogadishu was overthrown by one faction of United Somalia Congress (USC) in January 1991, to January 1992, between approximately 200,000 – 300,000 people, mostly civilians had been killed or wounded by the fighting clansmen. The fighting between opposition armed Somali clans were intense, and such level of conflict between Somalis virtually rule out all possibility of international humanitarian mission, in addition who really would to intervene militarily to stop the fighting?

The citations are at the end; however, due to technical problem, you will not be able to see it within the paper. So I guess you have to do your paper by youself.

The old Somali regime was loaded with Soviet’s weapons; it was estimated that the former Somali army had abandoned more than 40,000 weapons that were available for any Somalis. But the Somali people did not want firearms; the reason for them to hold the arms was essentially to secure basic foodstuffs for one’s family against the armed bandits. Many Somali leaders had requested United Nations (UN) assistance in disarming the population, and Somalis would voluntarily exchange their weapon for food. However, neither foreign governments nor international organizations were willing to attempt any food relief mission within such chaotic situation.

In theory, as the former Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, then the Special Envoy of the UN argues in his book, "Somalia, the Missed Opportunities", there should have been enough international organizations and states who could help. For, Somalia was a member of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a former close ally of the United States (US), and maintained good relation with its two former main colonizers, Britain and Italy. And finally, Somalia was a member of the UN. Yet, as Sahnoun phased, " Sadly, none of these nations or institutions, all supposedly friends of Somalia and its people, moved seriously to help the country in its hour of need in a timely and efficient way." As Washington Post’s dateline of September 24 1992 points out, "Just thirty years after it officially became an independent nation, Somalia essentially has ceased to exist."

To understand the Somali Crisis of early 1990’s is to understand the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. The reasons of Somali state’s collapse are complex. To summarize: it was due to both its historical and culture heritage.

As president Aden Abdille Osman declared in 1965, "Reunification of all Somalis is the very reason of life for our nation." During the second part of 19^th century, the "Greater Somalia," the territory claimed by Somali nationalism was chopped up into five pieces under five different jurisdictions: British Somaliland (North), Italian Somaliland (South), French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ethiopia (Ogaden) and Kenyan Northern Frontier District (NFD). Hence, the modern Somali nationalism is argued by scholars as a unique case, for it is looking not only for self-determination but also reunification of Somalis’ inhabited territories. Consequently, from its independence in July 1960 until the late 1980s (in accordance Pan Somali Nationalism that has found the Somali State), the country was in a nearly continuous war with all its neighbors. Indeed, the reunification of all Somali people served as a principle and propaganda to legitimize the newly formed nation state. Yet, such pan-nationalism represents also a constant threat to all the neighboring countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Consequently, it weakened seriously Somalia’s regional economic development and its diplomatic relations. To counter Somalis’ threat, the Ethiopian regime, according to Somali sources for instance had manipulated the armed opposition groups that lighted the terrible Somali Civil War.

One cannot search the intricacies of Somalia without being intrigued by the centrality of the clan to Somali culture, and unarguably to a certain degree it causes the Somali conflict. To briefly describe the essentials of Somali traditional polity, we shall argue that it depends, just like any other pre-industrialized civilizations, on the sense of collectivism rather individualism. Nevertheless, it too, has its own characteristic.

Sir Richard Burton’s famous story about the Bugandan sergeant (today’s Uganda) is a self-explained example. The Bugandan sergeant told to his officer: "Somalis, Bwana, they no good: each man his own sultan." Sir Burton himself argued that Somali nomads were a "fierce and turbulent race of republicans." In terms of Anthropology, kinship represents the only insurance for pre-capitalized nations, and the Somalis too, believe that the clan system is their safeguard, it makes them stronger against outsider nomads. Such belief gives to the Somalis a cascading lineage identity; a lineage based on a series of stages. In the Somalis’ term, "Myself against my family, my family against other families of my clan, my clan against all other clans, and all the Somalis against the rest of the world."

The root of the Somali Crisis is de facto generated by the clan rivalry based on cascading lineage identity. That regime of Siad Barre could maintain itself for so long was due precisely to that Barre was able to play the game of rivalries between clans. The major armed political groups too (USC, SSDF, SNM, SPF, SDA, SDM), are also purely clan based.

1. United Somali Congress (USC). The USC was created by the Hawiye clan in central Somalia around Mogadishu.
2. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The SSDF was created by the Majertain subclan of the Darood, who live in northeast Somalia.
3. Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM was created by the Issaq clan of northwestern Somalia, it has proclaimed the independence of Somaliland.
4. Somali Patriotic Front (SPF). The SPF was founded by the Ogadeni, a subclan of Darood who live partly in southern and partly in central Somalia.
5. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). The SDM is the movement of the Rahanwein clan, they live in southern and western Somalia.
6. Somalia Democratic Association (SDA). The SDA is the party of the Dir clan living in northwestern Somalia.

The dictator Siad Barre left Mogadishu in a tank for his home country Gedo region on January 27, 1991. The Darood people, the traditional supporter of Barre government regrouped in Kismaayo and formed Somalia National Front (SNF). Barre’s son, General Maslah and son in law "Morgan" went abroad through Kenya on a military equipment purchasing mission. According to the report of The Minority Rights Group based in Britain "They purchased $27 Million worth of arms and petroleum at various black markets." From his new headquarters, Siad Barre planned to take back Mogadishu, yet his attack against USC’s positions failed. In May 1992, Barre fled into exile to Kenya in the face of a major military offensive lead by General Aided. Although Siad Barre later died in a misery condition, but the SNF remains active both in term of politics and military.

Just as one must understand the cultural context of a conflict, so too must one know the actors involved. The factions were at this stage obviously clan-based, the Hawiye clan based USC faction which is controlling the capital, Mogadishu is divided into two. The cause of internal dispute was not an ideological disagreement but subclan one over the issues of power and clan domination. Such division within the capital city area enhanced the already uncontrollable situation.

After Barre left Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi a member of Hawiye’s Abgal subclan was named very quickly by some USC civilian leaders as the new president without consulting any other clans and opposition groups. He sworn in on January 29 1992, and appointed a northerner, Umar Arteh Ghaalib, Barre’s last Prime Minister, as the new premier. However, although Mahdi was a successful businessman in the Motel Business, and his clan dominant surrounding Mogadishu area, Ali Mahdi himself had poor political authority. He was an unknown member of both the last elected parliament and the famous Manifesto Group (a group composed of ninety prominent Somalis elders, politicians, intellectuals and business people, it was establish in 1989, the purpose was to convince Siad Barre to resign); in addition, he did not contribute much militarily for the fall of Barre. As a result, when the USC leadership called for a national conference to draw up a new constitution, the idea was quickly rejected by other opposition forces.

General Mohamed Aided was a Hawiye of Habar Gidir subclan, which is located mainly at the outskirts of Bannadir and further north of the capital. By contrast with Mahdi, Aided fought against Barre. In fact Aided was one, if not the founder of USC. Therefore he believed that he had earned the legitimate right to rule Somalia. Beside the question on who should rule the country, the USC’s division lies also on the traditional clan rivalries. Mahdi’s Abgal subclan is a mainly sedentary life, and Aided’s Habar Gidir has a nomadic one. Some Somali scholars argue that the preliminary presidency of Mahdi reflects the fear of his clan vis-à-vis pastoral domination. Later, Aidid’s and Mahdi’s subclans tentatively agreed to power sharing. Aidid chaired the USC, while Mahdi stood as the Interim President.

In October 1992, when food and UN military begun to arriving at the sea port of Mogadishu, due too a series of mistrust, misunderstanding and confusion, Aidid created his own military force, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), because he perceived that the UN troops favored Mahdi. As the result of such distrust, General Aided alienated himself from the UN further.

The problem of General Aidid with the UN happened later when the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) backed by the US was beginning to disarm Somali militias. The explanation for their distrust and fight is not the purpose of this research; however, the point is that during a period of anarchy, where weapon is synonym as event law, the international community has only few options within such chaotic case. Either the international community negotiates with the protagonists, and receives their consent for the humanitarian mission. Or the international community resembles all necessary means for the mission and makes it clear to the warlords about its determination. Meanwhile gives to the warlords certain material incentives to work with the humanitarian teams, such as non-lethal equipment and food because after all, without the cooperation of local warlords, a large scale humanitarian mission is impossible to be carryout. Either solution could work if the international community has a consensus about the agenda; one successful example could be the Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. But Somalia of 1991 has no resemblance with Kuwait, Somalia is a mostly flat and arid region. After the fall of Berlin Wall, it represents no economic, military or political interests in terms of international politics. Therefore, except the UN, no one had a reason to go and help the Somalis.

In January 1991, after the fall of President Said Barre, the situation in Somalia became total chaos. Violence and drought produced a terrible famine, northern Somalia declared itself independent, and fighting intensified in the south especially between the two factions of USC, General Aidid against Interim President Mahdi. Yet, unfortunately for the starving Somalis, the international communities including the UN were preoccupied by the Persian Gulf crisis, a conflict that had far more international significance.

One year later, in January 1^st 1992, the Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali became new UN Secretary General. Boutros-Ghali himself an African, has an extensive knowledge about Somalia and worked closely with Siad Barre. One of his first acts was to receive the report of Undersecretary James Jonah concerning the Somali crisis, and the meantime the Security Council invoked Chapter VII and imposed an arm embargo on Somalia. In the same month, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to prepare within six months an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping. In February 12, Boutros Boutros-Ghali convened a conference (for consultation) in New York where representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, Islamic Conference, and Somali factions of Aided and Mahdi signed preliminary cease-fire in New York. Later James Jonah arrived at Mogadishu on 29 February. He mediated, after 4 days of intensive negotiations, an additional cease-fire document, singed by the two on March 3, 1992. At the same time the Secretary General appointed David Bassiouni as Coordinator to oversee the delivery of the UN humanitarian assistance to the affected population in all parts of Somalia, in liaison with other international Humanitarian Organizations. Six weeks after the cease-fire has been signed in NY, in April UN created the United Nations Operation in Somalia.

Some analyses have emphasized the destructive impact of militarization in southern Somalia as an explanation for the non-intervention. Such argument lay on the issue of abandoned weapons. Intensive fighting destroyed the local economy. Armed gunmen robbed from farms and villages, taking livestock, corps and whatever else they needed for their own survival. Somalis trying to flee the clan warfare created hundreds of thousands of refugees, flocking along the border with Kenya. Although international food aid arrived in Somalia, the fighting interrupted the traditional distribution channels based on community and elder. When the relief agencies pass out food to vulnerable unarmed civilians, gunmen shoot them dead so they could have it. UN and other NGO aids’ convoys were also subject to looting by armed gunmen, it hence undermined the already inefficient relief mission. As the head of the Mogadishu port Mr. Hussein explained, "If I didn’t give them a bag of rice they would kill me. They are prepared to die for a bag of rice." The fact was that the cease-fire of March provided a precious opportunity for the international community to go further about peacemaking and disarming the clansmen, nevertheless, "after the cessation of hostilities UN senior diplomats foundered in the field, the Security Council dithered, and UN relief agencies squandered valuable time." Why this sudden disinterest vis-à-vis of Somalia?

Obviously, in order to be successful in the UNOSOM mission, the UN has to overcome about 5 main obstacles. For, there is no single explanation for the long delay of the UN deployment in Somalia.

1. The bureaucracy of the UN headquarters and branches

• Because of disorganization in the UN, less than a third of the food that was needed has been delivered.

• The UN armed troops from the Third World Countries such as Pakistan were not materially equipped to handle such task. The food relief operation requires a high level of armed protection, and strong in numbers, which only the US could provide.

4. Balkans vs. Somalia

• According to NY Times of August 3 1992, Boutros-Ghali was in dispute with Sec-Council. The Council just expanded UN operation in Yugoslavia but neglected Somalia, a Third World country.

Indeed, we can argue that if Africans don’t care about Africans why should other people do so?

Why were Africans disinterested about what was happening in Somalia? One explanation could be that member states of OAU don’t have means to do what European can do for Yugoslavia. Western States have the means, but there were preoccupied with problem of their owns, such legitimate argument was equally valid for the American administration of 1992.

The American political arena of 1992 was a burning one. The US was not only experiencing economic recession and a high budget deficit, but it was also a time of presidential election. During the campaigns, the potential winner President Bush had being accused by the challenger, Bill Clinton of paying more attention and money to foreign policy than to a declining US economic that affected the daily life of Americans. Beside of the presidential election and budgetary deficit, three additional reasons held back the US government from Somalia.

• The Cold War was over, the US had no more strategic interest on Somalia. If Somalia faction leaders did not care about starving Somalis, nor other African, Arabic and Islamic leaders, why should the US? The problem in Somalia was not the US’s concern.

• Militarily, the US troops just end the Gulf War, but still operating in northern Iraq in the Operation Provide Comfort. It is not militarily recommended to operate in several fronts.
• All understood that a lasting solution to the problem in Somalia would have to go far beyond of emergency relief, it in reality requires the tasks of national reconciliation and the resuscitation of Somali government.

As far as President Bush was concerned, his main objective was reelection; therefore, he must show initiative in cutting the budget deficit and unnecessary spending. Yet, despite the above political and economical reasons, voices urging the White House to implement a greater response to the crisis in Somalia was growing especially form the Houses of Representatives. The Democratic candidate Bill Clinton too, criticized President Bush for inaction in dealing with problems such as Bosnia, Somalia and for weak support of the UN. Television news bombarded American public with images of dying Somali women, elders and children. The mainstream newspapers such as New York Times, Washington Post, as well as other nationally distributed ones, kept their East African correspondents busy for "Top News". The Bush administration as the result began to sank itself into a dilemma. An active reaction to the Somali Crisis could cost Bush his reelection. A passive one would engender not only additional critics, destroy his reputation and legacy of international class leader forever.

The 102^nd (1991-1992) Congress played a crucial role in getting the US to act to save starving Somalis. As we know, divergence of opinions exists between the people in the White House and on the Hill. For, they do not see issues from the same perspective. As far as Somalia is concerned, both the White House and Houses of Representatives have had always a particular relation with it. Although the US foreign policy has traditionally been more focused towards Europe and the Middle East than to problems on the Black Continent, yet the Cold War gave to Somalia a special position from what to negotiate between the Soviet and the US. After the war between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden in 1977-1978, Carter administration for pure strategic reason replaced Moscow and became the main partner of Siad Barre. A decade later in 1988, Mengistu Haile Mariam and Siad Barre ultimately concluded the war of 1978 in Djibouti by singing the peace accord. Yet, ironically for Somalia, this only worsened the crisis.

One of the two armed opposition groups located in Ethiopia, the Somali National Movement (SNM) attacked the Northern Somali region, formerly known as British Somali Land in May 1988. For the people in Pentagon, this was initially viewed as another cross border attack that warranting continuation of US military assistance. But the US embassy soon realized that the SNM had come home to stay. It became a civil conflict. Ambassador Crigler in June 1988 recommended freezing shipments of lethal weapon material to Somalia. In reaction, the Department of State of the US government sent a consultant, Robert Gersony, to Somalia to report the situation. At the meantime, US military assistance and joint training exercises continued until 1989.

Yet, unlike the White House, the US Houses of Representatives have taking an interest in Somali affairs from another perspective. The Congress was more concerned about democracy, famine and Human Rights issues in Somalia. Since 1991, members of committees have also sent numerous letters to the UN, Somali faction leaders, and Bush administration to express their concern about Somalia.

• In July 14,1988, the House Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing after government troop’s killing in the Northern Somalia.
• In 1989, President Bush from Congress’s pressure on the issue of the US military aid funds to Barre’s regime, had decided to end all aid to Barre’s regime..
• After the fall of Siad Barre, Congress began to express concern on the Somali situation. In late April 1991, the Senate Resolution 115, introduced by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas), called on the president of the US to "lead a world wide humanitarian effort in Somalia to relieve the suffering and for the UN to make the humanitarian crisis in Somalia an item of high priority."
• Andrew Natsios, the head of the USAID’s office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, testified before Congress in January 1992. He commented that Somalia was "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the World."
• In March 1992, the Africa Subcommittee requested that the Congressional Research Service organizes a seminar on the Horn, the Sub-Committee held later its own hearing on all the Horn Countries. Senator Kassebaum and Paul Simon (D-IL), the chairman of the Africa Subcommittee argued for a more active role for the US, and criticized Bush for having "watered down" the UN Security Counsel resolution for the deployment of UN troop.
• By the end of the second congressional session (Dec. 1992), a total of seven hearings had been held on Somalia.

During the second session, new visits of congressional members to Somalia were able to transmit new information to the executive branch and could facilitate the president’s decision to send US troops to Somalia in early December 1992. At the meantime, Senator Simon also proposed along with other members a measure that would allow the Defense Department to pay up to $300 million US expenses for UN peacekeeping rather than the State Department. Such initiative had a purpose of to facilitate US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions during a period of budgetary constraints.

As Johnston and Ted Dagne have pointed out, The African American Congressional members were extremly active as the crisis worsened. In April 1992, the Black Caucus sent a letter to Secretary of State James Baker asking the US to take "the initiative in the UN in forcefully advocating a high level UN presence in Somalia." Representative Lewis introduced in October 1992 a resolution that demanded the US government to be more actively involved in Somalia through the UN, as it was authorized by the Security Council, in order to protect relief operations.

1. Vis-à-vis of the UN

For the Bush administration, the coast of Peacekeeping operation could be argued as one of the biggest obstacle. According to Paul Lewis, the US government already was $140 million in arrears on its peacekeeping account, and Secretary James Baker had received a cool reception when he asked Congress for another $810 million for 1992-93 peacekeeping operations, not counting the extra cost for Somalia.

Perhaps due to both internal and external pressures, on July 27, 1992, the State Department issued a public statement that supported the sending of armed UN security personnel to Somalia, the first US active statement since the beginning of the Somali Crisis. And finally, in September 1992, Bush’s address to the UN General Assembly confirmed the administration’s new tendency towards Somalia.

It was obvious that the disagreement of opinion among Americans about Somalia existed not only between the Executive and Legislative branches, at the bureaucratic level too, they were split into two unequally weighted sides. The elements that traditionally are in favor of strong US leadership; such as USAID, Office for Disaster Relief, the African Bureau had less political chips to play during a election year than president’s advisers, such as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs John Bolton, the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Colin Powell who all were extremely cautious about further involvement. Consequently, Bush administration had decided not to be fully cooperative with the UN plan, but only in a passive way such as presidential order of air-lift food relief on August 14 1992. In November, CIA’s top official made clear that General Aidid could easily massacre the lightly armed UN force already present in Mogadishu, should he decide to do so. Smith Hempstone Jr., US ambassador to Kenya, then argued in one diplomatic cable that "If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu." Obviously, he was referring to the disastrous US mission in Lebanon where 241 marines perished. Like lots US officials, Hempstone believed that without a fundamental change from the Somali side and consistent aid from the international community for Nation Rebuilding, a temporary engagement will probably just delay the death of unarmed Somali from 1993 to 1994. CIA as well as Pentagon presumably was suspecting any military plan that focused on a short and efficacy deployment in Somalia. The CIA director Robert Gates believed that "the anarchy in Somalia is so sweeping and the warring factions so firmly entrenched that the country will require long term international involvement." Just like Gates, another important figure, the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who was cautious about further involvement, believed that if the US decided to go to Somalia, the US would have to stay much longer than the necessary time for food distribution. However, unlike Gates, Scowcroft had also a pro military engagement side. As Cusimano point out, the latter as a believer on the New World Order doctrine perceived that "only the US could provide the international community with the leadership it needed. There were responsibilities intrinsic to being the world’s only remaining superpower." Hence only the US could deploy quickly and with impact in Somalia. Therefore, the US should intervene. Other people, who were close to the president see the Somali situation represented an occasion for Bush to leave office with another US historical triumph after Persian Gulf War after his election loss. However, they also believed that if so, the Bush’s administration must act quickly, for the Clinton team was coming in, and they would not have adequate people to deal with Somalia in the early months. Meanwhile, the USAID was reporting that one quarter of Somali children under age five had already died. As the degree of pressure for intervention has been increased since summer 1992, the non-intervention hard-liners began to change. "If you project out a thousand deaths a day over a year, you have an appalling situation," said one official of the Defense Department.

At the meantime, people unanimously agreed about two things. Firstly, the result of Somali war was the famine, but the cause of Somalis’ massive death was due to lack of an adequate web of distribution, not the shortage of food. Despite international food aid, which were arriving from sea and air, Somalis were still dying out of starvation. Secondly, it was clear that by mid-1992 that the UN could not carry out the food relief mission. Its operation lacked the organizational resources and a coherent strategy. The US government was also aware that due to its limited participation, the food air-lift was just not working. Meanwhile the grounded UN troops could barely protect themselves from Somali gunmen. Without an adequate military protection, humanitarian ships were looted even before they could arrive in Mogadishu port, UN workers of Somali origin were killed, and relief workers had to pay gunmen with cars looked like the one of "Mad Max" to protect their relief missions. "Relief workers called these vehicles "technicals" because they were listed on their expense reports as "technical assistance." Such consequences were results of the UN’s inadequate logistical and financial resources, yet we have also to recognize that the Somali Crisis was beyond the UN experience. The Somali experience was unique, there was no government with which to negotiate but only armed men who had nothing else to lose. In sum, the reality from the ground gave the UN peacekeeping mission two options: to appease those with weapons or oppose them by bigger force, but such forces could only come from America.

Nevertheless, by all accounts, the decision had to be made by the president himself. In July, acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger informed his staff that the president wanted the department to be more cautious on Somalia. On July, the State Department supported publicly the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. On August 3, the government announced that it was prepared to send additional 80,000 metric tons of food to Somalia. The White House also announced that the US was ready to transport UN peacekeeping forces to Somalia, and the Department of Defense was instructed to begin an emergency food airlift to northern Kenya (from Mombassa) and Somalia. US ambassador to the UN Edward Perkins was authorized to hold consultations with Security Council members on additional measures to assure that humanitarian food relief could be delivered. USAID’s assistant Administrator Andrew Natsios was appointed the president’s special coordinator for Somali relief. Meanwhile the international NGOs were intensifying their campaign for further US and international action.

President Bush’s August decision to mount an airlift had shifted discussion within the US administration and created an "activist consensus" that had not existed previously. His speech to the UN General Assembly on September 21 had in addition an uncountable international impact. In this historical speech, Bush demonstrated that the end of the Cold War was changing the old US attitudes towards the UN peacekeeping missions, which was considered as off-limits by the US military. Such signal alerted the US military official, they knew that they had to be consistent with the commander in chief although they viewed the potentiality from a different position. But the real push form the top level did not came until after George Bush had lost his presidential reelection.

However, it is very questionable to argue that President Bush had decided to engage fully into the Somali Crisis because of his electoral defeat, for such argument is simply irresponsible and too speculative. We could suspect that if the Ross Perot, the Third Party candidate did not spend 60 million US dollar and did not won 19 per cent of election vote, President Bush might have won the election of 1992, since analysis show Mr. Perot had attracted more voters from Republican camp than Democrat one. Yet the result of election and Bush’s personal determination vis-à-vis of Somalia Crisis is rather two different issues. Does a correlation exist? An accurate answer requires another analytical work. As far as this research is concerned, it focuses only on the overall US administration and presidential leadership attitude toward Somali Crisis from an objective point of view based upon facts.

At any rate, after Bill Clinton had defeated George Bush in the US presidential election on November 3^rd, 1992, in a series of moves, President Bush showed that he was no longer constrained by internal issues; he was ready to move if the national and international communities were behind him. For President Bush, to be involved in Somalia required several conditions. Internally, he must receive full support from the military, media, and the American people. Externally, he needed the UN to accept the US conditions which were absolutely necessary, base on standards of the Pentagon for the US military deployment.

On 21 November, the Deputies’ Committee of the National Security Council considered the options on Somalia and on the basis of a recommendation from the chief of staff, Colin Powell, decided conditionally in favor of intervention. On November 21, Admiral David Jeremiah, Powell’s representative stated that if the use of US forces was necessary for the mission, then the US military would do the job. On Wednesday morning, November 25, 1992, President Bush held an unusual National Security Council (NSC) meeting at the White House. The issue was about could and should the US do anything about the Somali Crisis. Such issue was not only about the Somalia, but also about the moral value of the US administration especially in the Post Cold War era. By the end of the meeting, Bush generally chose "the Desert Storm way of handling Somalia."

On the ground, such new policy as expected had received positive reaction from all horizons. From the Congress, although representatives such as then the Speaker of the House Thomas Foley (D-Wash) asked Bush to consult with a bipartisan group of legislators, or Representative John Murtha (D-Pa) criticized the UN inefficiency and lack of US interests, mostly in the Congress; however, approved the intervention. As the Senator Paul Simon pointed out, "we have to respond. You just can’t sit back and let hundreds of thousands of people die and say we have no interest in this." African American community leaders such as Reverend Jesse Jackson, who had traveled to Somalia earlier in 1992, called "A global Thanksgiving gesture to Somalia that affects the whole world." And the newly elected president, Bill Clinton too commented that he supports the action because he believe that the US should do more about Somalia.

At the meantime, a new CIA report showed that "clan forces were both poorly organized and trained, had inconsistent morale and motivation, had weapons that could be easily be overcome, and therefore did not pose a serious threat."

Although the CIA report did not show any signs of support for a use of US force, yet undoubtedly this report partly showed a possibility of defeating the clan forces quickly after all.

According to Natsios, another factor might also have influenced Bush. A week following the ground intervention, President Bush in a conversation in the Oval Office told Johnston President of CARE, and then acting director of humanitarian relief operations for the UN in Somalia, that the last time he had seen Johnston was in Sudan during the Sahelian famine of the mid-1980s at a feeding center for severely malnourished children. As Andrew Natsios phased, "Bush clearly troubled by his memory of that feeding center drew a direct parallel between that famine and Somalia."

On December 4^th, 1992, exactly a month after Bush’s defeat, he announced that the US was going to deploy a member of military force to Somalia in order to create a safe environment for the humanitarian aid mission. The deployment named Operation Restore Hope began on December 9, it peaked at about 25,800 US troops joined by thousands of other nationalities.

The documents that are available to the public today tend to demonstrate that before November 1992, President Bush was not able to be actively concerned about the Somali humanitarian crisis due to first of all, the financial constrain. The peacekeeping budget had already exceeded the initial limit for the fiscal year 1992, in addition of record high of trade deficits and unemployment rate, the Congress was consequently unwilling to increase the foreign intervention budget.

Secondly, President Bush was also concerned about his presidential reelection. Although his approval rate attained as high as 90% just after the "liberation" of Kuwait from Iraq in the early 1991, yet the economic recession and other internal policy failure had seriously jeopardized in 1992 his chance of reelection. Thirdly, precisely due to the economic recession, President Bush was criticized by the Democrat candidate Bill Clinton, and the Third Party Candidate Rose Perot of not paying enough attention to the US internal issues. Therefore, George Bush as a politician should by no account engage in any policy that would enhance his decreasing approval rate, and cause him to lose the reelection.

Nevertheless, we could also conclude that although President Bush before November 1992 was not able to deal with an active role about the Somali Crisis and UN’s early relief operation, he was nevertheless willing at least to help indirectly in terms of logistics. For instance, contribution of US food and airlift operations made possible by the US air force. Hence, before President Bush had lost his reelection, he was only able or willing to help with only a minimum participation in the respect to the US international position.

It is an intriguing question of why suddenly the White House had changed its policy vis-à-vis of UNOSOM, and who benefit from such policy shift? Different theories argue differently, some suspected it was purely a mastermind plan, a strategy that was designed by Bush and his people to leave to the young Bill Clinton an enormous consequence to deal with. Other suspected that the US was going to establish another military base in the Horn of Africa, and Somalia just like the Persian Gulf, had oil. Of cause, the reality shows that neither theory is credible. Somalia has no oil technically, may be except a potentiality in the Ogaden region. As far as the US position in the Horn is concerned, the example of the current warm US relationship vis-à-vis of Ethiopia and Eritrea could be argued as one concrete answer to the US hegemonic plan over the Red Sea. However, Eritrea was seceded from Ethiopia under Clinton’s presidency in 1993. Moreover, if President George Bush refused to overthrown Saddam Hussein of Iraq by force in 1991, and to establish a democratic regime in Iraq where the oil is, thus we could suspect that there was no reason for the US to takeover Somalia by engage itself into nation building and challenge an anarchy of tremendous violence.

So, if Somalia of 1992 did not represent any interests for the US government, why the winner of the Cold War was willing for the first time to be involved in an external crisis in which it did not have a direct national interest? One argument that what we could point out is President Bush’s final decision was rather about his vision of a New World Order, the U.S. foreign policy’s role and moral concerns in the post-Cold War world, and finally the administration’s own place in history. Consequently in accordance with his own doctrine, soon after his had lost the reelection in the early November, he was then free from all constrains and ready to use all of his power to order new initiatives toward Somalia famine.

President Bush legitimized his final decision on a moral ground. As he announced on December 4^th in his speech to the nation, "I understand the United States alone cannot right the world’s wrongs, but we also know that some crisis in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement in the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus, save thousands of innocents from death."

We could also suspect that people in Washington, who are mostly bureaucrats believed that Somalia case was for them an opportunity to seize additional power during a period of transition. On the other words, the last moment of Bush’s presidency was a moment of power vacuum, and by creating the Somalia intervention, the bureaucracy who will remain in office would not only enhance their political position but accumulate supplementary responsibilities vis-à-vis of new Clinton team.

Overall, within one month, Bush’s people had to come out with not only plans but also logistical and human resources in order to realize such fantastic plan. And precisely, the failure of UNISOM II had a lot to do with unprepared people who are constrained by technical difficulties and the UN’s bureaucratic manners. One example was the misunderstanding or unclear agenda between American officials with the UN top officials. The timing was never setup clearly about when the UN troops will replace Americans and when the US troops will withdrew from Somalia. In addition, the issue of disarm Somalis was never quiet clear between the US and the UN team. UN Secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali strongly argued for disarmament as the primary objective for the American troops, yet American military officials including Powell were reluctant to believe on such possibility.

As the long term agenda between the US and UN differed. Hence, it could be suggested that the Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II were damned to fail because they were launched without international political consensus about its purpose and real long term objective. Both the top US and UN officials had their own personal agendas, and believed the Somali case was simply a means to achieve their power-seeking objective. Therefore, they could reach an agreement on the principal intervention objective, though knowing it lacked consensus.
 
 

Bush, George. Presidential address, Washington Post, December 5, 1992, P.A16

Callahan, Thomas. 1994. “Some Observations On Somalia’s Past and Future,” CSIS Africa Notes. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.

Clark, Jeffrey. “Debacle in Somalia,” New York Times, Dec 29, 1991

Cusimano, Maryann. 1995. “Operation Restore Hope: The Bush Administration’s Decision to Intervene in Somalia.” The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign Service, George Town University, Washington, D.C.

Dagne, Theodore. 1992. “Somalia: A Country at War – Prospects for Peace and Reconciliation.” CRS Report for Congress, The Library of Congress.

Gersony, Robert. 1989. “Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Others.” Washington, D.C: Bureau for Displaced Persons, U.S. Department of State.

Ghalib, James Mohamed. 1995. “The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience.” Lilian Barber Press, INC. NY. New York.

Gordon, Michael R. 1992. “Somali Aid Plan is Called Most Ambitious Options,” New York Times, November 28.

Hashim, Alice Bettis. 1997.  "Paradigms and Models," The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia. University press of America.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on Africa, “Reported Massacres and Indiscriminate Killings in Somalia.” Hearing, 100th Congress, 2nd session, July 14, 1988.

House Select Committee on Hunger, “Somalia: The Case for Action.” Hearing, 102nd Congress, 2nd session, July 22, 1992.

“In Somalia, Graves and Devastation,” New York Times, January 30, 1991, p. A2.

Johnston, Harry and Dagne, Ted. 1997. “Congress and the Somalia Crisis,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, ed., Learning from Somalia: the lessons of armed humanitarian intervention. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Krauss, Clifford. “Washington Seeks Conditions on Plan for Somalia Force.” New York Times, November 27, 1992.

Lewis, Ioan & Mayall, James. 1996. “Chapter 4. Somalia,” in James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991-1994 : United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. New York : Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, Paul. “Security Council Weight Role in Somalia Civil War,” New York Times, March 18, 1992.

Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar. 1995. “Somalia: state collapse, multilateral intervention, and strategies for political reconstruction.” Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Menkhaus, Ken. 2000. “Traditional Conflict management in Contemporary Somalia,” in I. William Zartman, ed., Traditional Cures for modern Conflicts: African Conflict “Medicine.” Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Oberdorfer, Don. “The Path to Intervention,” Washington Post, December 6, 1992.

Oberdorfer, Don. “Somalia’s Overshadowed Tragedy,” Washington Post, August 12, 1992.

Oberdorfer, Don. “US to Start Food Airlift to Somalia,” Washington Post, August 15, 1992.

Oberdorfer and Lancaster, “UN Chief Weights Use of US Troops in Somalia,” Washington Post, November 27, 1992.

Perlez, Jane. “Chaotic Somalia Starves as Strongmen Battle,” New York Times, October 4, 1992.

Rawson, David. 1994. “Dealing with disintegration,” in Ahmed I. Samatar, ed., The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.

Richburg, Keith. “Somali Aid May Spur New Violence: Armed Clans Battle to Steal, and to Guard Food.” Washington Post, August 26, 1992.

Sahnoun, Mohamed. 1994. “Somalia, The Missed Opportunities.” Washington DC: United State Institute of Peace Press.

Samatar, Said S. 1991. “Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil.” London : Minority Rights Group.

Sciolino, Elaine. “Bush Offered Troops to Aid Somalis Despite CIA’s Doubts,” New York Times, December 2, 1992.

“United Nations Year Book,” 1992. New York : United Nations.
 

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