Somali Conflict: Part III. 1992

US Position

• Andrew Natsios, (for more detail about his role and opinion, see Natsios’s own essay, Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos. Learning from Somalia: The lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, Westview Press, 1997, available in Book Store) the head of the USAID’s office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, testified before Congress in January 1992, he commented that Somalia was "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the World." (Lyons, 1995: 30, quote from Natsios’ statement before the House Select Committee on Hunger, January 30, 1992)

• According to Clark, the US mission (Under Pickering, I think) to the UN did not support Resolution 733, "due to fearing the financial obligation, so that it did not call for peacekeeping. (Lyons, 1995: 30, quote taken from Clark, "Debacle in Somalia". Also from Washington Post, July 29, 1992. NY Times, Dec 29, 1991)"

• Herman Cohen Testified before Africa Sub Committee of the Senate For Rel-Com on Somalia and Zaire (102 Cong. 2 sess) (see the section on the Congress).

• Herman Cohen and Natsios were in favor of engagement, but other such as John Bolton (A.S for Int-Org Affairs) and Brent Scowcroft (Nat-Sec Adviser) were wary of further involvement.

• After establishment of UNSOM ( I ), on April 1992, the US government was still rejecting peacekeeping mission, due to the fear about the cost. ( Lyons took from Paul Lewis, "Security Council Weighs Role in Somali Civil War," NY Times, March 18, 1992) (I think he or his assistant took a wrong data, See the NY time section)

• Following Boutros-Ghali’s installation on January 1, 1992, one of his first acts was to receive the report of Undersecretary James Jonah

• The Security Council acted in January by invoking Chapter VII and imposed an arm embargo.

• In the same January, the Sec Council requested the Sec-Gen to prepare within six months an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping (CSIS Africa Notes, Callahan: 227, March 1994)."

• The Secretary General invited representatives from two USC factions (Mahdi and Aideed’s camps) to NY in 12-14. Feb 1992 (for consultation), where they signed a cease-faire (UN Year Book, 1992: 200).

• UN Special Envoy James Jonah arrived at Mogadishu on 29 February. He mediated, after 4 days of intensive negotiations, an additional cease-faire document, singed by the two factions in Mogadishu on March 3, 1992. (UN year book 1992: 593, 199, 200)

• March 17, the Council supported the Sec-Gen’s decision to dispatch a UN team to prepare a plan for cease-fire monitoring mechanism (UN year Book, 1992:199).
• On 20 March, the Sec-Gen appointed David Bassiouni as Coordinator to oversee the delivery of the UN humanitarian assistance to the affected population in all parts of Somalia, in liaison with other international Hum-Org (UN Book 1992: 201).

• The Security Council decided on April 24, 1992 to establish UN operation on Somalia (UNSOM)

• 100 day action program for Somalia.
• The Resolution 794 of Dec. 3, 1992 was the first to establish a humanitarian operation under Chapter VII of the charter. It also grain the unanimous support, including countries that are believing the West uses humanitarian mission for their own interests and interference of domestic affairs, which include China and other African States.
• On 18 December 1992, the Gen Ass adopted resolution 47/160. Urges all States and organizations to help (see UN Year Book, 1992:595).
• The Americans did not like the way that Boutros-Ghali prepared UNSOM I. The US estimate of at least 30,000 heavily armed troop, they were unhappy that Boutros-Ghali pic 3,500 randomly. In fact Sahnoun neither (see his book on page 39).

1, The bureaucracy of the UN headquarters and brunches.

2, The UN armed troop was not materially equipped to handle such task, it required a high level of armed protection, and strong in soldier number.

3. Logistic and financial constrain of the UN.

4. Precisely because of the non-US support.

According to NY Times

• In April 26, "because of US objection, the UN could not send 500 armed blue beret."

• In April 28, Editorial wrote that " Bush Administration balking at humanitarian intervention in Somalia because of cost, $7.5 million."

• According to NY Times of July 25, 1992. UN Sec-Gen Boutros-Ghali proposes broad expansion of UN forces in Somalia, impoverished nation that he says has been denied its share of world attention as it sinks into lawlessness and famine.
• According to NY Times of August 3, 1992. Boutros-Ghali was in dispute with Sec-Council, which is controlled by Western nation. The Council just expanded UN operation in Yugoslavia but neglected black Somalia, a Third World country.

(See also The New Interventionism 1991-1994, Somalia, P.109)

Ambassador Sahnoun became Special Envoy in April 28. 92, and resigned at the end of October (UN Year Book, 1992:199).

• International relief workers described Sahnoun as someone who talked to everyone, listened carefully, and worked hard (CSIS Africa Notes, Callahan: 227, March 1994) (In fact I haven’t seen anyone criticize him yet).
• In October 1992, in a conference in Geneva, he criticized the UN. "A whole year slipped by whilst the UN and the international community, save the international Red Cross and a few nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, watched Somalia descend into this hell (CSIS Africa Notes, Callahan: 227, March 1994)."

• During 60 Minutes interview, Q: an early intervention by the UN could save lives? Sahnoun: yes, definitively." (In my view, it is logic)

Somalia Representative at the UN

• By the letter of 15 May, Somalia said it was particularly grateful that a Spe-Rep had been appointed. In an annex, Somalia again put forward suggestion for solving the crisis (UN Book, 1992: 203) (The Year Book did not indicate further about the Annex).

According to Natsios (Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos. Learning from Somalia: The lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, Westview Press, 1997. P.78). A week following the ground intervention, Pr.Bush told to President of CARE and then acting director of humanitarian relief operations for the UN in Somalia, in a conversation in the Oval Office that the last time he had seen Johnston was in Sudan during the Sahelian famine of the mid-1980s at a feeding center for severely malnourished children. Bush clearly troubled by his memory of that feeding center drew a direct parallel between that famine and Somalia. (Natsios commented in the Notes "I attended this meeting between Johnston and President Bush in the Oval Office on Dec. 12, 1992.").

Congress

• The US Congress had taken an interest in Somali affairs since many years, and some people might felt a special responsibility or obligation for the suffering of Somali people.
• Congress was concerned about democracy under Barre and regional arm race in the Horn. In July 14,1988, the House Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing after government troop’s killing in the North (House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Su-Com on Africa, Reported Massacres and Indiscriminate Killings in Somalia, hearing, 100^th Cong., 2^nd sess., July 14, 1988.).
• In 1989, Bush was under Congress pressure for the Aid funds to Barre’s regime, US military aid was; therefor, terminated.

• Congress began to express concern on the Somali situation in late April 1991 in a Senate resolution introduced by Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans) (Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, Congress and the Somalia Crisis. The lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst. P. 192). Sen. Resolution 115 called on the president of the US to "lead a world wide humanitarian effort in Somalia to relieve the suffering and for the UN to make the humanitarian crisis in Somalia an item of high priority." (S.R. 115. Introduced April 25, 1991; referred to Senate Committee on For-Rel April 25, 19991; reported to Senate by Senate Com on For-Rel June 27, 1991; agreed to in Senate without amendment and with a preamble by voice vote June28, 1991.) (Taken from Notes of Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne)
• In March 1992, the Senate-Com on Africa requested that the Congressional Research Service organizes a seminar on the Horn, the Sub-Com held its own hearing on all the Horn Countries. While H. Cohen was testifying, Senator Kassebaum argued for a more active role for the US, and criticized Bush for having "watered down" the language of a UN Sec-Coun resolution for the deployment of UN troop. (Taken from Notes of Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne) (this matches with NY Times and UN year book)
• By the end of the second Congressional session (Dec. 1992), a total of seven hearings had been held on Somalia.
• Senator Kassebaum was the first member of Congress to visit the southern Somalia. She later testified on the Committee, affirmed that "the situation has reached the point where the UN should go forword with the security force with or without Gen. Aided or Ali Mahdi’s consent (Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne: 193) (quote from: House Select Committee on Hunger, Somalia: The Case for Action, hearing, 102^nd Cong., 2^nd sess., July 22, 1992, p.6.)."
• Many believed that Africa Bureau was sympathetic to deploying a peacekeeping force but Int-Organization Bureau was opposed.

The successors of Sahnoun and Oakley did not negotiate directly with the protagonists, the face to face talking was done by their deputies and aids. This is a style of diplomacy that do not appreciate by people who have guns; therefore power.

According to Gerard Prunier, in his Note No11., Boutros-Ghali’s position was an ambiguous one. "In his capacity as leader of Egyptian diplomacy, he had dealt for years with the Barre regime and Taken care of the substantial financial and military aid given by Cairo to the Somali dictatorship. He had been a major player (together with the Italians) in the last minute negotiations in November-December 1990, which were aimed officially at a smooth transition out of the dictatorship but which were never seen by the Somalis as a neutral player but rather as somebody who still had the same political agenda, using the UN’s rather than Cairo’s resources. This resulted in the UN intervention being from the start supported by the Ali Mahdi group and considered as hostile by the Aideed coalition, a view not altogether without grounds and something that was generally missed by US diplomacy. (Taken from Gerard Prunier’s notes. The experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope. Learning from Somalia. P.147." No copy, it is only available
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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