The
Missed Opportunities for Peace Building in Somalia
Part II. Somali Situation in 1991
| It is relevant to mention that Barre himself
missed an exit. In 1990, Siad Barre refused the pledge of Manifesto Group,
which suggested replacing Barre with an interim committee. In a phone conversation
with Hashim, the representative of UNDP in Somalia, Barre said that "I
will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me out of here; and if they
try, I will take the whole country with me." (See the complete
text from The Somali Challenge; edit by Samatar. p.119) As the result,
the paranoid Barre arrested most member of Manifesto Group, this
act further lowered his remain authority. On the day of trial, the whole
population of Mogadishu came out to show their disagreement towards Bare.
According to Salwe, the excited mod surrounded the court, Barre under such
pressure finally released Manifesto members. (The Collapse of the Somali
State, Abdisalam M. Issa Salwe. 1994. P. 78.). |
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International Mediation
According to Samatar (The
Somali Challenge, Samatar: 119), two attempts were made by the
international community to save Barre.
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Under the auspices of Italy and Egypt. A meeting
in Cairo was called between the Barre’s regime Vs. SNM and USC. The latter
refused to attend, may be because they knew they would have the power.
(He did not give a specific time)
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On Dec. 25, 1990, the government announced
that a free, multiparty election would be conducted in Feb. 1991. Such
measure had a purpose of to keep Said Barre on power safely until the election,
during which he could reorganize his remain force.
Yet, it was obvious for all Western powerhouses
to realize Barre’s ear isIn order to avoid a situation of power vacuum,
numerous international actors attempted to create a unified coalition that
could take over.
According to Lyons (Lyons
and Ahmed I. Samatar: Somalia: State Collapse, multilateral intervention,
and Strategies for Political Reconstruction P.28), Italy made several
attempts (I think they are the ones that Samatar mentioned in the above):
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Italy tried to start a mediation between Manifesto
Group and Siad Barre in mid-1990 without success. (Lyons:
28, quote from Horn of Africa Bulletin)
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Italy encouraged Egyptian Minister Boutros-Ghali
to hold last minute talks between Barre and opposition in Cairo in December
1990, yet SNM and USC refused to talk with Barre. (Lyons:
28, quote from AFP Dec.1990)
When the regime was finally overthrown,
a power vacuum occurred
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No rebel faction had the wherewithal, or de
facto powerful enough to take the lead. No leader could be accepted
by the overall rebel movements to be the new head and to fulfill the core
Somali government.
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They did not have a well planed agenda. The
consensus among rebel movements could not reach beyond the end of Barre
regime.
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Each one had its own little plan, which is
to be President, but has no vision about an alternative state.
This is also important to notice that the fall
of Siad Barre coincided with Gulf War then Balkans war, hence, disinterested
by western peace bookers.
Siad Barre left Mogadishu in a tank on January
27, 1991, to Gedo region (In Somalia, Graves and Devastation,
New York Times, January 30, 1991, p. A2). Barre retreated
to his home country in the Gedo region of Somalia. From his new headquarters,
he planned to take back Mogadishu, yet he had lost his last support from
Darods. To defend them selves, Darod people regrouped in Kismaayo and formed
Somalia National Front (SNF). Under the command of General Xuseen Xasan,
they launched a massive offensive against USC’s position, but their attacks
were too weak.
Barre’s son, General Maslah and son in law
"Morgan" went abroad through Kenya on an arms purchashing mission. According
to the report of The Minority Rights Group based in Britain (Samatar,
Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil Aug, 1991. P.21.) "They purchased
$27 Million worth of arms and petroleum at various black markets".
The problem between Ali Mahdi and Mohamed
Aided
Mahdi (a Hawiye), was named by some USC
civilian leaders, without any consultation with any other clans and oppositions
to become the new president. He sworn in on Jan. 29, 1992, and appointed
a northerner, Umar Arteh Ghaalib as the new premier. However, in addition
he is a lesser known member of both the last elected parliament and Manifesto
Group; therefore, he had a poor authority. During the ceremony, Mahdi was
also side by formed senior members of Barre regime, including General Hussein
Kulmiye Afrah, and Mohamed Osman.
Mahdi is businessman who was very successful
in Motel Business. He is a member of Hawiye’s Abgal clan, dominant around
the area surrounding Mogadishu, he did not do much for the fall of Barre.
General Aided was a Hawiye of Habar Gidir clan, located mainly at the outskirts
of Bannadir and further north of the capital, he did lots fighting. The
root cause of USC’s division lies also in the traditional clan rivalities.
Mahdi’s Abgal clan is a mainly sedentary life. Aided’s Habar Gidir has
a nomadic life. The preliminary presidency of Mahdi reflected the fear
of his clan vis-à-vis of pastoral domination.
In the North
In the former Somaliland, in February, the
SNM convened a conference in Berbera, participants including elders and
notables from various clans such as the Dhulbahante, Warsangali Daarood,
and Godabbirsay. Later the meeting issued a join declaration, which indicates
that they will boycott the coming USC organized conference (Somalia:
a Nation in Turmoil. Aug, 1991). On May 17, 1991, SNM declared
the region of north an independent Somaliland Republic.
The Djibouti Conference
The government of Djibouti alarmed by the
situation in Somalia held two conferences in June and July 1991. (see
Abdisalam M. Issa Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 1994.
P85-86)
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The first preparation for a conference of national
reconciliation took place when former president Aadan Cismaan (1960-67),
former Prime Minister Cabdirisaaq Xaaji Xuseen (1964-67) and Maxamed Xaaji
Ibraahim Cigaal (1967-69) met in Djibouti. Under President Abtidoon of
Djibouti.
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The first meeting was from June 5th
to 6th 1991; representatives of SSDF, SPM, USC and SDM participate.
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Djibouti also asked the UN to participate,
but the latter declined (Callahan, CSIS Africa Notes,
March 1994, P.227.).
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They agreed to hold another meeting in Djibouti
next month, in July 1991, and invited also SNM, SDA and USF.
The second conference was hold between July 15-21 (see Africa Confidential
9 August 1991)
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The meeting was participated by USC, SPM, SSDF, SDA, SDM, and USF. But
SNM did not participate.
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The conference was also attended by delegations from USA, Italy, Egypt,
France, Germany, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Kenya,
Uganda, Sudan, Oman, the USSR, the Arab League, the OAU, OIC, EC and IGADD.
(NO UN)
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They also made six important recommendations (Abdisalam M.
Issa Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State: 1994: 86).
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To implement a cease fire from Friday 26 July 1991
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The unity of Somalia be sacrosanct
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To promulgate the 1960 constitution for not more than two years from the
day when the government was formed
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To form a government involving the opposition groups
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To establish a legislature of 123 members
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To enact regional autonomy
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The meeting had created new clan hostility between Hawiye against Darod,
and Inter Hawiye. (Taken from Amnesty International, Somalia:
A Human Rights Disaster, AL-Index: AFR 52/01/92, August 1992, P.6.)
Alliance during the conference was USC+SDM, SSDF+SPM, SDA+USF, SDA
and USF kept a low profile.
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According to Africa Confidential (9, August 1991), during the discussion,
the main issue was not only the statue of the presidency (individual or
collective) but also the premier. "USC wanted an Issak, SSDF and SPM wanted
a Darod." Italian Ambassador, Mario Sicca had suggested for a Darod.
As Salwe commented, this meeting itself was a failure
for the rebuilding of Somalia ( Salwe, The Collapse of
the Somali State. 1994. P.86), because disorganization and opportunistic
behavior among factions undermined the search for solution.
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Mahdi, which is a part of the problem, was still in
power.
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Aided declined to attend so long as Mahdi is still
claming as interim president (Lyons, 1995: 29).
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SPM later repudiated its representatives (Lyons, 1995:
29).
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It gave credit to the undemocratic development, perplexing
the country. (Taken from Mohamed Ali Direh, The Process
of Restoring Peace and National Reconciliaiton in Somalia: A Handbook for
Inter Clan Dialogue, 1/4/92, P.25)
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"Many Somalis regarded the Djibouti talks as an
Italian attempt to move its new allies in the Manifesto Group, including
Ali Mahdi…"(Lyons, 1995: 29).
UN (See critics of Lyons and Samatar, P.30)
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In February 1992, representatives of Aided and Mahdi
signed cease-fire in NY.
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Signed the official cease-fire in Mogadishu in March.
(Yet, Lyons argue that it involved only SNM clans in Mogadishu and neglected
the other neutral factions elsewhere)
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April 24, 1992, creation of UN Operation in Somalia
(UNSOM), which is 6 weeks after the cease fire signed in NY.
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An ensuing security assessment mission took place
between 7 and 11 May.
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A UN inter-agency mission visited the north and central
of Somalia from 26 June to 4 July.
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In August, UN emergency relief staffs were present
at Berbera and Boroma (UN year book 1991).
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The Council adopted resolution 1991/3, appeals to
member states and international governmental and non-governmental organizations
to maintain their work.
As Ray Bonner comment, "if the UN had given its full
support to the Djibouti conference or had taken up the matter in the G.
Assembly, success, even if partial, might have been possible. ((Lyons,
1995: 29) (quote from Ray Bonner, "Why We Went," Mother Jones,
vol. 18 (March-April 1993), p. 55.).
For instance, when Ali Mahdi requested a special
session of the Gen. Assembly be dedicated to Somalia in Oct 1991, James
Jonah (Under Sec for Pol-Affaire) sent a message urging the Nairobi office
"to endeavor to discourage at the local level any idea for holding a
special session on Somalia. (Callahan, CSIS Africa
Notes, March 1994. P.227)"
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