The Missed Opportunities for Peace Building in Somalia
 

Part II. Somali Situation in 1991


 
 
 
It is relevant to mention that Barre himself missed an exit. In 1990, Siad Barre refused the pledge of Manifesto Group, which suggested replacing Barre with an interim committee. In a phone conversation with Hashim, the representative of UNDP in Somalia, Barre said that "I will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me out of here; and if they try, I will take the whole country with me." (See the complete text from The Somali Challenge; edit by Samatar. p.119) As the result, the paranoid Barre arrested most member of Manifesto Group, this act further lowered his remain authority. On the day of trial, the whole population of Mogadishu came out to show their disagreement towards Bare. According to Salwe, the excited mod surrounded the court, Barre under such pressure finally released Manifesto members. (The Collapse of the Somali State, Abdisalam M. Issa Salwe. 1994. P. 78.).
Note from Empereur.com:
The materials presented in this site have a purpose of education, I am not a revisionist, hence not trying to rewrite history. This is a draft paper of one of my research; for I do not post the original one, and no footnotes. Please do not email me by saying you are a 12 years old, and “please send me the paper.” 
My last recommendation: Go to your college library and get some books.
Good luck on your paper.

By the way, if you are an UCLA student, I understand why you are doing this, well, we know that UCLA sucks.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 

International Mediation

According to Samatar (The Somali Challenge, Samatar: 119), two attempts were made by the international community to save Barre.

Yet, it was obvious for all Western powerhouses to realize Barre’s ear isIn order to avoid a situation of power vacuum, numerous international actors attempted to create a unified coalition that could take over.

According to Lyons (Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar: Somalia: State Collapse, multilateral intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction P.28), Italy made several attempts (I think they are the ones that Samatar mentioned in the above):

When the regime was finally overthrown, a power vacuum occurred This is also important to notice that the fall of Siad Barre coincided with Gulf War then Balkans war, hence, disinterested by western peace bookers.

Siad Barre left Mogadishu in a tank on January 27, 1991, to Gedo region (In Somalia, Graves and Devastation, New York Times, January 30, 1991, p. A2). Barre retreated to his home country in the Gedo region of Somalia. From his new headquarters, he planned to take back Mogadishu, yet he had lost his last support from Darods. To defend them selves, Darod people regrouped in Kismaayo and formed Somalia National Front (SNF). Under the command of General Xuseen Xasan, they launched a massive offensive against USC’s position, but their attacks were too weak.

Barre’s son, General Maslah and son in law "Morgan" went abroad through Kenya on an arms purchashing mission. According to the report of The Minority Rights Group based in Britain (Samatar, Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil Aug, 1991. P.21.) "They purchased $27 Million worth of arms and petroleum at various black markets".

The problem between Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Aided

Mahdi (a Hawiye), was named by some USC civilian leaders, without any consultation with any other clans and oppositions to become the new president. He sworn in on Jan. 29, 1992, and appointed a northerner, Umar Arteh Ghaalib as the new premier. However, in addition he is a lesser known member of both the last elected parliament and Manifesto Group; therefore, he had a poor authority. During the ceremony, Mahdi was also side by formed senior members of Barre regime, including General Hussein Kulmiye Afrah, and Mohamed Osman.

Mahdi is businessman who was very successful in Motel Business. He is a member of Hawiye’s Abgal clan, dominant around the area surrounding Mogadishu, he did not do much for the fall of Barre. General Aided was a Hawiye of Habar Gidir clan, located mainly at the outskirts of Bannadir and further north of the capital, he did lots fighting. The root cause of USC’s division lies also in the traditional clan rivalities. Mahdi’s Abgal clan is a mainly sedentary life. Aided’s Habar Gidir has a nomadic life. The preliminary presidency of Mahdi reflected the fear of his clan vis-à-vis of pastoral domination.

In the North

In the former Somaliland, in February, the SNM convened a conference in Berbera, participants including elders and notables from various clans such as the Dhulbahante, Warsangali Daarood, and Godabbirsay. Later the meeting issued a join declaration, which indicates that they will boycott the coming USC organized conference (Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil. Aug, 1991). On May 17, 1991, SNM declared the region of north an independent Somaliland Republic.

The Djibouti Conference

The government of Djibouti alarmed by the situation in Somalia held two conferences in June and July 1991. (see Abdisalam M. Issa Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 1994. P85-86)

The second conference was hold between July 15-21 (see Africa Confidential 9 August 1991)
  1. To implement a cease fire from Friday 26 July 1991
  2. The unity of Somalia be sacrosanct
  3. To promulgate the 1960 constitution for not more than two years from the day when the government was formed
  4. To form a government involving the opposition groups
  5. To establish a legislature of 123 members
  6. To enact regional autonomy
As Salwe commented, this meeting itself was a failure for the rebuilding of Somalia ( Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State. 1994. P.86), because disorganization and opportunistic behavior among factions undermined the search for solution. UN (See critics of Lyons and Samatar, P.30) As Ray Bonner comment, "if the UN had given its full support to the Djibouti conference or had taken up the matter in the G. Assembly, success, even if partial, might have been possible. ((Lyons, 1995: 29) (quote from Ray Bonner, "Why We Went," Mother Jones, vol. 18 (March-April 1993), p. 55.).

For instance, when Ali Mahdi requested a special session of the Gen. Assembly be dedicated to Somalia in Oct 1991, James Jonah (Under Sec for Pol-Affaire) sent a message urging the Nairobi office "to endeavor to discourage at the local level any idea for holding a special session on Somalia. (Callahan, CSIS Africa Notes, March 1994. P.227)"
 
   
 
 
Home
Webmaster
Somalia
Email Me
Discussion Board

 
This site is designed by Empereur Lui meme 
Wu Wei 
The Founder and the Webmaster of Empereur.com
Copyright © 2000 Empereur.com. Tous droits réservés.