Issak Clan versus M.O.D

In reality, the root cause of Issak (or Isaq or Isaaq) revolt against Siad Barre’s regime could be traced much deeper than just "attack of SNM from Ethiopia." For even elders, in this case Issak’s, who are supposedly to held a position of peace resolution too, incited the rebellion against southerners; an act that generalized the clan based conflict.

First of all, the northerners of former British Somaliland, mostly Issak but as well as small clans resented the power of central government in Mogadishu, which was controlled by southern groups, particularly the Marehan. (Marehan is a subclan of the Darod clan which president Siad Barre belonged) Secondly, the collapse of the Somali State is one in which institutional collapse, economic failure, decreasing feasibility of traditional livelihood options, and environmental degradation are inseparable. Wisner, Ben. "Jilaal, Gu, Hagaa, and Der: Living with the Somali Land, and Living Well" in The Somali Challenge, From Catastrophe to Renewal? Edited by A. I. Samatar. Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1994, p.27. Beside of globalization of livestock trade in the Middle East and a growing competition in the industry which engendered a gradual prices of sheep, goats, cattle and camels to decrease, war in Ogaden destroyed the historical custom of seasonal livestock movement back and forth across the Somalia and Ethiopia. Such economic decline was generating a concrete threat to the long time established social political status-quo between pastoralists – merchants, and the state. The northern regions used to produce surplus of livestock that accounted for the largest share of Somali consumption and exportation. Northerners were not only forced to decrease the production, but also felt an injustice because they were not benefiting from their economic production. In addition, according to Sahnoun (Somalia: Missed Opportunity. P.6), they were also displeased with demagogic policy of Barre vis-à-vis of Ethiopia, which worsen the situation. "They (Issaks) were also frustrated in their desire to maintain close ties with the population across the border…the Mogadishu government used the issue in a demagogic fashion to exacerbate tensions with its neighbors." Finally, Ogadeni refugees from Ethiopia as new comers were back by the government, lots of them were conscripted into the national army. As Ogadeni influence was growing in the north, it challenged; therefore, the interests of Issaks’.

Diplomatic Negotiation between Somalia and Ethiopia

Representatives from both Somalia and Ethiopia first met in Djibouti in 1986 for a peace initiative under the auspices of Djibouti president Abtidon, but no agreement was reached. Finally, in 1988, a time where both governments were confronting with deadly climate, economic deterioration, and increasing internal social political instability. In the April.6 of that year, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa agreed on a nonaggression and noninterference treaty. The Ethiopian regime further agreed to close Somali armed opposition camps. Mengistu immediately closed Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali National Movement (SNM) radio station, Radio Halgan, and arrested SSDF leaders and seized their heavy weapon. As the result, it became a matter of survival for SNM to change rapidly its strategy.

As the result, the war stared in May 1988

SNM decided to fight back to the northern regions and to occupy strategic cities of Hargeysa, Berbera and Burao. They attacked Burao and Hargeisa. According to Africa Confidential (July 1988), the SNM had less than 2000 fighters at first, but it was field quickly with prisoners released from Hargeisa and Burao, plus new subclan militias including: Habr Awal, Habr Yonis and Habr Jello. SNM armed those men with weapons sized from Adadley military depot. Moreover, in reaction of Barre’s counter measure, Issak elders believed that the massive arrest and killing vis-à-vis of Issak people, both in the north and south by the governmental force signify that the clan as whole was under threat. Therefore, all Issaks must be united behind of SNM.

Reaction of Barre

In terms of politics (Africa Confidential, July :1988)

• Siad Barre argued that Issak’s revolt was directly towards Darood clan. However, such theory was poorly embraced by the Darood subclans including Majerteen, the Dolbahanta and the Ogaden.
• Said Barre also argued that the up rising of Issaks was an anti-Pan Somali heritage conspiracy, which was going to lead a secession of former Somaliland.

• SNM successfully captured Burao, as it was occupying Hargeysa, Siad Barre reacted by sending his son in law, General Mohammed Siad Hersi "Morgan".
• Air Force made a difference

1. According to Africa Confidential (July,1988), airplanes come from two bases. The MiG-17s based at Berbera were flew by Somalis, and the Hawker Hunters from Baidowe were piloted by South African and ex-Rhodesian mercenaries.
2. According to Richard Greenfield (African Report, 1989:66), a secret contact between Somalia and South Africa was made since 1979 after the Ogaden war (may be to counter a common enemy, Cuban). For each sortie, according to Greenfield, mercenaries required thousands of dollars.
3. Barre also received military supply from Colonel Qaddafy, both from air and sea. Moreover, a Libyan Airlines flight landed on October 7 and allegedly delivered canisters of nerve gas to the air force warehouses (Greenfield, 1989:67).

• Siad Barre also used former Ogadeni refugees, now integrated into regular army and other non-Issak local clans to fight against SNM and Issak people with government supplied arms. The overwhelming of firearm supply had made the north a lawless locality.

Although at the end, the Barre’s regime regained the control of northern regions, yet SNM was able to maneuver in the countryside, and because weapon flu to local population, the north also became a lawless territory. Thus, Barre has no more authority over it. Others also viewed this as a war between M.O.D vs. Issak, for example, there was no Dolbahante Generals at fronts. ???

Refugee

By July 1988, according to Africa Confidential (July 1988), Ethiopian and international sources were suggesting around 240000.

It effects to Mogadishu

• Northerner refugees tell the first hand story to local Mogadishu people.
• Increasing of food price due to the disruption of imports of staple foodstuffs through the northern ports. Sugar has gone up 450 per cent and corn 650 per cent. This is making the southerners increasingly disillusioned with the Siad Barre’s regime.

This was still during the time of cold war, Somalia which was an ally to the US during that period received from 1983 to 1990 almost $5000 million worth of military resources (Terrence Lyons, "Great Powers and Conflict Reduction in the Horn of Africa," in I. W. Zartman, ed., Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World War, 1995). Worth, even after 1988, the Pentagon was still exercising and pushing a policy of common military cooperation program (See below). Italy on the other hand, had a strong economic hand on the Barre’s affair. As the result, it was in the agenda of no one to forecast a removal of Barre from power. However, as Sahnoun (1994:6) and Lyons (1995: 26)(he quote from Sahnoun)argued, the international community, especially the US and Italy who maintained a good connection could facilitate a diplomacy that pressured Mogadishu further, which would resulted in lesser degree of chaos.

Reaction of the US

The SNM attack in the North in May 1988 was initially viewed as another cross border attack that warranting continuation of US military assistance. But the US embassy soon realized that the SNM had come home to stay. It became a civil conflict.

• Ambassador Crigler in June 1988 recommended freezing shipments of lethal weapon material to Somalia (David Rawson. The Somali Challenge. Part 6, Dealing with disintegration. 1994. P. 173)

• In reaction of the massacres, the Department of State of the US government hired and send a consultant, Robert Gersony, to Somalia to report the situation.

• The US Ambassador Frank Crigler attempted to facilitate a reconciliation in 1989; however, this attempt was weaken by continued US military assistance and joint training exercises (Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar. p. 27). According to Rawson (1994: 173) the US Central Command kept training exercises. The Bright Star exercise in August 1988, several small scale exercises held later in the year, and another Bright Star planned for 1989. A joint exercise, Operation Eagle Claw, was aborted when Mogadishu experienced riot, in June 1989 and people were killed on the beach. So American soldier left consequently.
• Ali Samantar as Premier Minister came on a mediatory mission to the US in Jan. 1989.

Obviously, it is a falling government, according to Africa Confidential, Siad was offered asylum in July by both Saudi Arabia and the USA. (Africa Confidential, 16 Dec 1988, Vol 29 No 25).

• January, on a visit to Djibouti, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary then, commented that: "One cannot continue making aid available if the condition on the ground are so full of conflict that it is not possible for aid workers to deliver help safely, or at all." (I forgot where I get that quote)

Yet, we perhaps could argue that before the war of 1988, there was another moment in which a change would occur.

According to I. M. Lewis (A Modern History of Somalia, 1988:254), in May 1986, Siad was injured in an almost fatal car crash. His security guard hijacked a hospital doctor at gunpoint, rushed to the scene without explanation, thus the doctor had no equipment. During his days in Saudi Arabia for the recovery, General Ali Samatar took charge of the government. Samatar was loyal, he did not take any advantage. However, Siad authority suffered a seriously blow, member of his own family and kinsmen were fighting for possible succession. Before the accident, Barre seemed to consider the Foreign Minister (Maternal brother, Abdarahman Jama Barre) to prepare to succeed him, but after the accident, the limelight switched to his son General Maslah. Samatar, according to local observer (Lewis: 257) had missed his chance of securing power. But Samatar is from a traditionally disadvantaged minority group with client links only with one of the dominant clans, the Majerteyn. According to Africa Confidential (July 29, 1988)Gen. Samatar has had unequaled opportunities to seize power in the past… He remains without substantial clan backing as he comes from a despised group.

Inquiries of Importance

• Amnesty International, A Long Term Human Rights Crisis (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1988)
• U.S General Accounting Office , Somalia Observations Regarding the Northern Conflict and resulting Conditions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1989)
• Africa Watch, Somalia: A Governmant at War with Its Own People: Testimonies about Killings and the Conflict in the North (London: Africa Watch, 1990).
• UN report of 18.09.88

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