The failure of the U.N and international community as whole could not be just elucidated as a question of determination, self-interest and bureaucracy. The massacre of ten Belgian soldiers by hutu militias, and the failure of Somali experience, explain why no member countries did want to contribute any troops. Yet, when the French proposed her help, although it was clear among the knowledgeable officials in the U.N about her long ties to the hutu elite in Rwanda, it was approved simply because they were the only volunteer. I remember during that period, in French television channels, private as public, the Rwanda issue was on the headline of every day’s evening news at 8pm. Other programs and news media were emphasizing on the history of Rwanda, and indeed described the tutsis as the victims of hutus organized killing. Nevertheless, I got also impression that Armee Patriotique Rwandaise (A.P.R) are the bad guys backed by Uganda and don’t event speak French as other Rwandan do. This is the first time that I being taught abut the social political environment of Rwanda beside my vague memory left from discussions between my fathers and his colleagues during my childhood. Few years latter, the French media start to question the nature of “Operation Turquoise”, and had or had not French soldiers purposely leave hutu extremist to continue the killing? Today, the French government not only has eliminated any option of a future solo foreign military adventure, lost all influences over Great Lakes region (Rwanda & former Zaire), but have to also hand over her former hutu protégé to Kagame as a sign of “friendship”.

Previous to 1994, he policy of Washington vis-à-vis of hutu regime was to emphasize on a transitional Rwandan government based upon Arusha accords. Diplomatically speaking it is appropriate, but it did not feet accurately with the position that the U.S holds. Such weak position is due, in my assumption to two factors: the symptom of Somali experience, and I suspect also caused by her disinterest and lack of knowledge on Rwandan political environment.

However, out of my expectation, the American position was in fact more complicate than that. According to African-Confidential (January, 2000:10), Belgian senator Alain Destexh (ex-head the International Crisis Group) who examined the role of Belgium, France and the U.N, is appealing for a same investigation for the role of the U.S. He argues that the refusal to describe the 1994 massacre as “genocide” worsen the situation. Belgian senator believes that if the U.S had immediately done so, the U.N would have had to get involved.

The 1994 double genocides were a dramatic experience for Rwanda as well as for the U.S. This might explain why after F.P.R took power, the policy of the U.S toward Rwanda has changed. During Secretary Albright’s trip to Africa (foreign policy bulletin 1998), in her declaration made at joint press conference in December 11, 1997, she promised to Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu “we want to do what we can to help.” In addition, she declared that the U.S was working on a $30 million improvement project on judicial system, going to provide $1.7 million to assist demobilized soldiers, $1.2 million to support education and $1 million to promote democracy and reconciliation. In terms of the human rights issues, she argues that it is difficult for a country as such “to put itself back together and reconcile.” Overall, Secretary Albright showed to the international community that the American foreign policy toward Africa is once again active, and Rwanda is among the first to be beneficiary.

The tutsi minority is now controlling the new regime in Kigali, though the power is shared with hutus moderates, and de facto hutus from the predominantly hutu democratic republican movement, the M.D.R do hold ministerial position and the President Pasteur Bizimungu is a hutu him self, nevertheless the Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame is the real head of the state. In addition, the new Rwandan army, police forces are controlled by tutsis. During my research, I suspect that due to Kagame’s incredible past, he is capable of doing all to maintain his personal authority. My hypothesis is based firstly on the mysterious deaths of his tutsis and hutus collaborators, his broken friendship with both Uganda and Congo president Museveni and Kabila. For instance, the killing of Seth Sendashonga is one frightening story among others. The latter was shot dead on May 1998 in Nairobi where he exiled, he was a hutu moderate and belonged to F.P.R, as its trusted Interior Minister, but he was also one of few to dare contradict Kagame (Africa-Confidential 29 May 1998). Others who used to be Kagame’s close collaborators went to Brussels or Canada, and denounced Kagame’s connection with assassination of other F.P.R tutsi elite. In addition, I am also questioning on Kagame’s responsibility on the death of the ex- Rwanda dictator Habyarimana, and why the elements of F.P.A were well prepared to launch attacks at the same time?

The very recent events in Rwandan politics show that a political combat is going on among internal factions. According to the B.B.C correspondent in Kigali, Chris Simpson, in March 4^{th, 2000 he reported that the recent resignation of Prime Minister Pierre-Celestin Rwigema is due to a rising tide of criticism in parliament and in the press. Rwigema is equally forthright about the fall from grace of the Rwandan speaker of Parliament, Joseph Sebarenzi, who fled the country in January, having hinted there had been threats to his life. According to the report of B.B.C journalist, “Mr Sebarenzi's sympathisers say he was the victim of a smear campaign orchestrated by his enemies in the government.” The internal struggle could only make the national reconciliation worsen, I am afraid that in terms of relation with hutu compatriots, the Rwandan government has a long way to go to convince the hutu majority that the regime is not serving the particular interest of tutsis, and Interhamwes and ex-F.A.R are the common enemies for all Rwandans.}

The myth about the new charismatic African leaders vanished with the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, moreover, conflict also ravage between Congo vs. Rwanda, Uganda, and Kagame vs. Museveni. According to the expression of Ambassador Shinn, the cards are badly played. From the end of December 1999 to March 2000, chronologically, Chinese Foreign Minister, French Minister of Cooperation, and Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel have successfully travailed to Great Lakes region. Presumably the old players are coming back and Washington needs urgently to react. America has been trying to find a way into Africa for some time and Mr. Holbrooke has discovered that one route is though the U.N. “For Africa, perhaps more than anywhere else, the U.N matters. Now, for the U.N, Africa matters” (The Economist February 2000). The first American National Summit on Africa has concluded in Washington D.C with President Clinton saying the U.S must do more to help Africa. Is this encouraging comment could be considered as a part of future foreign policy agenda of Washington, or it is just only a diplomatic show? It is certainly not fair to say that the U.S foreign policy is guided by her economic interests; however, in the context of Africa, only the unfortunate Somalia experience contradicts to such argument. Ambiguously, the recent declarations of American top officials including President Clinton, Secretary Albright and Ambassador Holbrooke demonstrate that Washington is more than just willing to participate, especially in the case of Great Lakes crisis. Yet, both secretary Cohen and Albright rule out a possibility of ground troop involvement. In my judgment, the complexity of American politics and the Somali symptom prevent Washington to fully engage in any foreign military conflict, especially in Africa, where she does not have a crucial interest, so far. On the other hand, the U.S, as the only super power craves to expand her hegemony and authority. The question is could the U.S, as a special member of international community played a significant role in African affaires?

Within the context of Post Cold War era, as far as the relationship between Rwanda and the U.S is concerned, it could be analyzed distinctively as two stages separate by 1994’s double genocides. Previous to the Rwandan double genocides, Washington’s policy was to stress on Arusha accords which was in my view a weak policy. After the even of 1994, it was possible that people in Washington received pressure from divers levels, and felt it is time to improve its policy, thus decides to change.

The current government in Kigali, in my believe benefice fully from the massacre of 1994. Firstly, the apology from president Clinton in 1998 could be interpreted as an accreditation to the tutsi government, and an offer of American umbrella. According to Colette Braeckman (Le Monde 10.1999), Kigali uses the massacre of tutsi people as a tactic to cover its military operation in Congo vis-à-vis of the international community, and to insure the assistance of Washington.

“Le génocide des Tutsis est désormais invoqué pour culpabiliser la communauté internationale et s'assurer la bienveillante complicité des Etats-Unis dans une entreprise de conquête et de contrôle des ressources du Congo”.

Since the starting of my curiosity on Great Lacks crisis over a year ago, I observed that only Washington is demonstrating such close and warm attitude towards Kigali and vice president Kagame. And de facto American officials, notably Dr. Rice travails too often in my judgment to Rwanda. In deed, the U.S.A.I.D to Rwanda is among the highest in category of African states. In different issues and occasions, by my personal observation, the declaration made by the Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Susan Rice is very much pro-Rwanda. It is also true that the very infrastructured Rwanda, with a total of 12,000 km of highway and 7 airports, represents to the U.S, at least under current circumstance, a geographically strategic location to expand her African roots, and in particular within the region of Great Lakes. Therefore, if my assumption is not objectively misunderstanding, it is a win-win situation for both countries. In addition, foreign observers could also suggest that the U.S could also extend her influence from Rwanda over Congo-Kinshasa, since unlike Rwanda, D.R.C produce more than just only coffee and tea.

In the present time, Rwanda government is preoccupied by numerous affaires, one of them is the war with Congo-Kinshasa, which Americans are also, in certain extend involved. During the end of 1999, American Ambassador to the U.N, Mr. Richard Holbrooke journeyed to the Great lacks region in order to implement the Lusaka Accords, and met with the interested protagonists respectively, including president Nujoma, Mugabe and Congolese rebel leaders (in Kigali). The good part is that the voyage of Mr. Holbrooke shows the determination of the international community and in particular the American one, the bad part is that according to the former American ambassador, an old African hand from Foggy Bottom, Dr. David .H Shinn “he doesn’t know that much about Africa.” Early this year, the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pledged to congress to prove a 42 million budget for the U.N military operation in Congo and at the mean time excluded the possibility of military engagement, it shows that once again, and especially during the election year, Washington is not determinate to engage on Congolese affaires due to the Somalia syndrome. While Washington try preaches peace, and as American proverb says “these is no free lunch,” a widespread suspicion among non-American analyzers question that its main objective is not in fact to create a stable condition for U.S.-led economic investment, trade, and development within the region of Great Lakes.

Lot experts suggest that the war in Congo-Kinshasa is actually a war between Rwandans. At the same time, because the complexity of political geography of the Central Africa region and international relations, this is a war that involved by countless African states, and at the international level, the win or lose of either Kabila or Kagame matters from Washington to Pyŏng yang.

As far as the dangerous liaison between Kabila and Kagame is concerned, in 1996 to back Kabila into power is for the vice president only a means which justify the end. Like Angola and Uganda, Congo represents a strategic position of national security matter for Rwanda. However, due to the arrogance and dominance of Kagame, the Congolese, and in particular elite in Kinshasa feel uncomfortably with Rwandan political and military imposition. At the same time I suspect that the causes of Ugandan and Rwandan invasion are numerous, especial for the latter one. From my reading, I have learned some extraordinary assumptions. For instance, according to the report of Simpson (B.B.C Focus on Africa March, 1999), a rumor in Goma says that Kabila had promised to Kagame land concession in exchange of military support.

“You don’t have to listen very hard in Goma to catch the old rumors that Rwanda wants to take over North and South Kivu, redrawing the colonial boundaries. Laurent Kabila is accused of signing the Kivus away in a deal with Kigali back in 1996, but then reneging on the deal, provoking Rwanda into a campaign to remove him.”

Kabila and Kagame were very close friends once. Yet, I believe the cause of war is precisely originated from this close relationship. As Machiavelli suggested, the end justify the means. Paul Kagame used Kabila to exterminate bahutu and interhamwes extremists, and at the same Kabila took the opportunity to overthrow Mobutu in order to realize his dream to become the leader of Congo-Zaire. Though, it was possible that both knew in advance that they have to face soon or later the threat from the other, nevertheless in 1996, the situation was in favor a multilateral military coalition to overthrow Mobutu, and from the personal interest of Kagame, it was better to back some one like Kabila, a relatively unknown rebel leader with visibly no troop, rather then for instance, a old “Fox” like Tshisekedi who according to some, works for the C.I.A.

On the other hand, due to the personal interests of Kabila and Kagame, for the need of security: vis-à-vis of them self, their political power control and for the future of their regimes; their political goal reified their relation based upon mutual understanding and help, into self-reinforcement and mutual constrain in terms of political and military force. As Realist School argues, in a state of self-help system, the search for security of one leaves all others in the system of absolutely insecure. Kagame’s imposition and manipulation on the political environment of Kabila feared not only Kabila but other Congolese elite as well. At the same period, when Kabila finally decided to order all Rwandan to leave immediately, which was a radical decision but certainly legitimate, it is interpreted by Rwandans as a sign of subversion and engender fearfulness toward Kabila. Consequently, in order to secure his personal power in a long term, the destruction of Kabila, and as early as possible, becomes the priority for Kagame. Therefore, at individual level, the condition of peace between Kagame and Kabila could be only reached, from my own assumption, in the division of Congo territory through time and negotiations, or the failure of existence of political or even physical life of one protagonist.

From a geopolitical point of view, for Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa, rich in resources and territory, but weak in administration, represents an opportunity in terms of economic and territorial expansion. The Great Lakes region is subject of regional conflict since decades. The one who control Kinshasa, just as the one who controlled Rome determines the existence of others. In the past, Joseph Mobutu backed different regional rebel groups and governments such as U.N.I.T.A and F.N.L.A in Angola and the hutu regime in Rwanda. Hence, the government in Kinshasa and the territory under its administration has been always considered as the key for the political stability of regional powerhouses. Thus, in my believe it is precisely for that matter, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia and even Sudano-Chadian troops have had engaged actively in the defense of Kabila regime against Rwanda and Uganda. Hence the war in Congo, participate by at least six nations, from a geopolitical point of view is a typical case of self-help. On the other words, the participation of regional powerhouses is for the purpose of to slash the rising arrogance of Rwandan tutsi regime as well as to maintain a regional power balance.

Rwanda is now occupying the Kivu provinces; I suspect that Rwanda government is planning to stay for an indeterminate period, and is obvious that Kigali uses Interhamwes’ attack as a cover to hide its real economic objective. In the late 1999, the main Goma based Congolese opposition, the Rally for Democracy in Congo (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) R.C.D, which is backed by Rwanda, establishes a local financial administration based upon tax collection over all businesses activities including regional trade and mineral exploitations. According to the broadcasting of R.F.I -Afrique, the administration is running by the Rwandan personnel. In accordance with different news reports from different countries, de facto as an occupation army, Rwandan occupation and R.C.D-Goma are not enjoying any popular support. As a matter of fact, from February 1-7, 2000, civilian in Bukavu located in the South Kivu struck for a week. Late, in February 14 people in Goma organized “Operation Dead City”, fallowed by the city of Uvira in the south Kivu. During the same month, Rwandans are also being accused of to involve in the assassination of a young anti Rwanda Catholic priest and local ethic bloody conflict between two tribes. In my hypothesis, Kigali is using the traditional tactic of Divide and Conquer in order to maintain its occupation in the northeast of Congo. Furthermore, from concordant sources, such as indicate by Braeckman, the exploitation and commercialization of minerals are under Rwandan monopoly, protected by the military, and several multinationals, such as Kenrow International of Gaithersburg, from Maryland, are represented in Kigali among others. According to the Daily Mail of Tanzania (January 14 1999), Kagame and James Kabare, hold interests in few mineral companies as well. Littlerock Mining Ltd, Tenfields Holdings Limited, Collier Ventures Ltd, Sapora Mining Ltd, and a business of import-export, Intermarket.

The current American chief in African affaire, the assistant secretary Dr. Susan Rice, in my belief is playing an important role in Rwanda’s foreign decision, without her consent, Rwanda and Uganda could not invade Congo two times within a year. Her vision of Africa in my belief is; however, just as the one of Richard Nixon vis-à-vis of Indochina, rather destructive. Her favoritism towards vice president Paul Kagame gives an occasion to skeptical voice to say that the U.S considers Rwanda, a geographically small but well infrastructured country as the American protégé and a military base in the Great lakes region. When Kabila’s Alliance de Force Democratic pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (A.D.F.L) overthrown Mobutu, it could be very possible that Washington’s support for Kabila at that time was only subordinated to its relationship with Rwanda and Uganda. As the result in 1998, it accepted the assurance of Kagame that Kabila could be overthrown quickly and easily, which was truly a possibility because the insurgents were at the gates of Kinshasa before being turned back by Kabila’s forces and their Angolan, Zimbabwean allies. In my belief, if Paul Kagame does not receive agreement from Washington, he has certainly no courage, in terms of military and financial capacity to stay in Congo, and not showing any sign of withdraw or compromise as Zimbabwe, Namibia or even in some extent Uganda have done.

Today, American official policy is to endorse the Lusaka accord and Ambassador Holbrooke seems to me very preoccupy by the Great Lakes crisis. Nevertheless, the American controversial relation toward Rwanda undermines he credibility. Both B.B.C and R.F.I reported Holbrooke’s sorrowful meeting with Congo foreign affairs Minister Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi at the end of 1999. According to the declaration of Congolese foreign minister after the meeting, he asked a fundamental question: if Rwanda does not withdraw from Congo, how peace process could be implemented? In the other word, if the Government of the United States does not pressure its protégé to withdrew and give up economic as well as territorial ambitions, the war between Congo and Rwanda will continue.

In sum, I suspect that American officials are trustfully anxious with the Great Lakes crisis, yet such ambiguous relation with Rwanda damages their credibility. In addition, neither Kabila nor Kagame has reason to negotiate, hence although both Holbrooke and Albright pledge sturdily to the international community, and the U.N is sending five-hundred cease-fire monitors accompanied by five-thousand troops, I can understand why Albright on the other hand rule out a possibility of American military involvement.

In my view, Kagame could be qualified as the Prince as Machiavelli had described. Of cause, I am certain that my judgment on him is wrong, and it is in addition not appropriate for me, a young and inexperienced man to form an opinion on the personality of Vice President Paul Kagame, indeed I never played with death. However, on the other hand, because of my ignorance, my judgment could have more “moral values” in certain extend. Any way, from the few pictures that I have found, Kagame looks more as an intellectual from the northeast of Africa rather than a military man come out of the jungle. From my readings, I am also impressed by how Kagame is handling with different peoples at different circumstance. According to Ambassador Shinn, Vice President is “a delightful person and very approachable”, but with all my respect, how Kagame could possibly be insolent with American officials? My first hypothesis on Kagame is that he is the kind of person who could make you feel as someone special to him, other wise, I don’t see how could such skinny person could have so much men willing to die for him. On the other hand, from the reading that I have done, I understood that Kagame is rather not that popular among western Africanist journalists. Indeed, Kagame is involved with a lot of death, including political assassination of his former “friends”, in the history of political culture and regardless culture differences, people like Kagame are not rare; however, the goal of Kagame, at least in the present time is to secure the interest of the people, not to oppress it, and maintain at the same time a stable society by all means. Thus, in my judgment, Kagame could be qualified as the Prince par excellence.

Kagame is without a doubt, a fully matured politician; it is hard to imagine how he or his political legend is going to end. Until then, Kagame will continue to manipulate the remaining hutu moderates, Congolese fraction, and even, permit me to say Americans. As far as the people represented by Kagame, the tutsis are concerned, they are living in a secure environment during the present time; however, it is hard to vision their future will be also compromising. The detestation between the local population of Kivus versus Banyamulenge is rising, recently the Banyamulenge community of Goma published an open letter, showing that they are willing to co-exist peacefully and fearing the revenge killing against them from local indigenous ethics will happen once again. In Burundi, Major Buyoya, for the reason of self-preservation is deporting hutu farmers into closed camps, is it a possible strategy for Kigali as well? After all, the political statue-quo of both states shares the same characteristic.

If we agree that the tyranny of the minority could never be eternal, does it mean that one day, when the international political environment changes once more, just like European colonization and the Cold War ended, will the Great Lakes region be affected again? If so, ethnic purification in Rwanda will reappear, and tutsis minority will be again the victims. As a matter of fact, just after the end of western colonization, Rwanda experienced a period of civil turbulence, and similar situation reappeared after the fall of Iron Curtain. While authoritarian regimes have ensured stability for long periods in Africa, for instance Zaire under Mobutu, it suggests that stability on this continent requires more than an accountable and responsive democratic government. What African regimes need is firstly a preconditioned stability; yet in my view neither the utopia of the United States of Africa nor the current Nation State system could deliver such possibility.

In Rwanda, the preconditioned stability could be undermined by both internal and external outcomes. After the independence, while hutu elite had preserved internal political control, they could not escape from the external influence. Now is the turn of Kagame to administrate the situation, and de facto he plays carefully with the westerners, yet internally although the circumstance demonstrates that hutus are once again under control of tutsis; nevertheless, the hate between both tribes is intensifying. I can not imagine how the Kagame era is going to end, and the daily news come form Kigali, Kinshasa, and Kampala are not compromising for Kagame. In nowadays, I feel that the political dissidence against Kagame is raise among his tutsis and hutus collaborators. Every day, in order to secure the power tutsi forces are killing hutu civilians, and tutsis are being massacred by Mai-Mai, interhamwes, ex-F.A. R and their Burundian counter parts. In my view, the one who undermines the security of tutsis is Kagame and not Rwandan hutus. Perhaps in the future, historians will conclude that, for the reason of self-preservation, the tutsis did the same thing as Romans did to Caesar.