Lusaka accord
After a year of failed attempts by Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), South Africa and other regional powerbrokers, the six countries involved in Africa's seven-nation war in the Democratic Republic of Congo signed the Agreement for a Cease-fire in the DRC in Lusaka Zambia on 10 July 1999.The war has inclined Kabila and his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia against a Congolese rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda since August 1998. At the end of negotiation, in the final round, because the remarkable diplomats from South Africa and Zambia, all combatants which are 47 recognized rebels plus governments, have signed. The main provisions of the agreement include: immediate cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the belligerent parties to investigate cease-fire violations, to work out mechanisms to disarm the identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to an established calendar; the deployment of a UN force tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the displaced persons and refugees; and the initiating of a Congolese National Dialogue intended to lead to a “new political dispensation in the DRC”.
Ironically, the nature of Lusaka accord is in fact to solve a war primarily started by non-Congolese, participate and financed by non-Congolese but based in Congo territory. For the reason of complexity of this war, specialties predicted also that Lusaka accord has only fifty-fifty percent chance of success, probably even less, if EU and the US do not give seriously their financial and diplomatic support. What factors have convinced belligerents to give up their firepower?
· The whole nature of Lusaka accord is actually based upon the idea that the conflict was nearing impasse, and most of foreign sponsors which are, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe backing Laurent Desire Kablia, Rwanda and Uganda backing the RCD factions and MLC (the Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo ) or the Rally for Congolese Democracy of Jean Pierre Bemba, would be better to concentrate more on their own growing internal political instabilities.
· Each belligerence regardless their military or territory size could grain something for this accord. For instance, by my understanding, the diplomatic relationship between Harare and Kampala become warmer since the accord of Lusaka because because Zimbabweans want to maintain their influence and security in the southeast of Congo and Uganda wants to do the same in northeast of Congo. They signed the accord not only because to protect their protégés, but also to exploit the rich mineral reserve in Congo-Kinshasa. (The interests for each side will be developed later in this section)
· In difference with other previous 23 peace attempts, the Lusaka agreement addresses not only to the Congo’s internal war, but also the boundary security demand by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola. Actually, the main cause back to 1997 and the official cause of the latter and from Bujumbura is to counter attack the Interahamwes, ex-FAR, Palipehutu and UNITA etc. which are all based in the north, east, south of DRC.
In the timetable of Lusaka accord at the origin, the national dialogue (le debate nationale) is to begin by 30 November in Congo-Kinshasa, a UN peacekeeping force is to be deployed by mid-December and all foreign troops are to withdraw by the end of February 2000. Among the western governments and United Nations, same attitude of enchantment was accompanied by supportive declarations. Kofi Annan has strongly appealed for a Security Council support. US president Bill Clinton has personally backed a major UN deployment in Congo Kinshasa and too, aware of accusation of Western double standards after the NATO and UN engagement in the Balkans. Hence, it will be very likely that the UN peacekeepers will once again back to Congo. According to Radio France International - Afrique, in order to inspect the future possible encampment of peacekeeping force in four different regions of DRC, UN officers and civilians, a total number of eleven are being deployed in the terrain. In the opinion of western specialists, the influential Washington based US institute for Peace1 and Brussels based International Crisis Group have produced a well calculated reports arguing that the West have to backing for the peace plan. (1 United States Institute for Peace: Reconstructing Peace in the Congo By David Smock and John Prendergast; www.usip.org)
The natures for each belligerent to sign the accord are:
I. Pro Kabila side
·
Kablila:
1. Kabila has a Weakening Coalition
2. Negotiating for his own political survival
3. Need time to reorganize his troops and government
4. Seeking international support
The main reason why Kabila has been forced to negotiate is because of the weakening commitment of his allies to continue the war, and the growing military pressure on his regime. Despite claims of victories, he has not recovered any of the territory taken by the rebels and their allies since the beginning of the war. It is clear that Kabila will be weakened by the cease-fire agreement. Yet, he may well manipulate it and the National Dialogue process to his advantage. Indeed, only seven political parties have been recognized by Kinshasa.
·
Zimbabwe
1. The cease-fire agreement as an exit strategy
2. Economic cost
3. Internal pressure
Zimbabwe needs to get out of the DRC for many different reasons: The goal of to prevent the rebels and their backers from taking over Kinshasa, maintaining control over the territory that they have already secured in the DRC, especially diamond-rich Mbuji-Mayi. Mineral concessions have being reached. It will not be in danger under the terms of the cease-fire deal. The pressure is internal: There has been mounting domestic opposition to Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC, and as a result, Zimbabwe has been looking for ways to pull out of a distant and increasingly unprofitable war. Zimbabwe needs to secure financial compensation against their investment in the war, which runs to an estimated US $3 million monthly. (“DRC gobbles up US $3 million a month”, Barnabas Thondhlana, Zimbabwe Independent, 8 August 1999) Among other things, IMF requested that the cabinet makes the undertakings and expenditures public.
·
Angola
1. A cease-fire agreement in the DRC allows concentration on UNITA activities at home
Back to 1996, Angola's involvement in the war, like that of Rwanda and Uganda, has not been motivated by any real support for Kabila. The Angolans knew that Kabila had links with UNITA, but it is possible that the collapse of his regime would lead to the withdrawal of his Katangese-dominated army back to Katanga. This move would make it possible for Kabila's troops to link up with UNITA. In addition, Angola questioned, if the new regime which replace Kabila would not be friend with UNITA.
·
Namibia
1. Personal friendship
2. Diamond
The Namibian involvement can only be explained in terms of the warm relationship between Namibian President Sam Nujoma, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Kabila. The friendship between Nujoma and Mugabe started in their early days as freedom fighters against white minority rule in their countries. Nujoma and Kabila used to belong to informal Marxist discussion groups in Dar Es Salaam, where they were
exiled in 1960's. After Kabila took over, he formed a diamond company with Nujoma.
II. Anti Kabila side
·
Uganda
·
Rwanda
·
RCD
· MLC
The Dilemma between Kampala and Kigali
However, by examining the historical process of Lusaka peace accord, it is obvious that between Moseveni’s Uganda and Kagame’s Rwanda, despite their personal friend ship, their political and economical ambition in regard toward Congo are much greater in respect to their years of amity, we have to remember that Laurent Kabila was once their common friend as well. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe on a possibility that a direct greater military tension between both in the future will occur.
A month after signing the accord, the war continues. While it does not dispute the content of the document, the main rebel group RCD has refused to sign the agreement. The RCD split earlier in May 1999, when Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was ousted as head of the group, but refused to step down and established his headquarters in Kisangani with Ugandan backing. Both the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda, and the RCD-Kisangani, supported by Uganda have demanded the exclusive right to sign the peace agreement. At the end the old leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba has lost his post, and in the hotel of Lusaka, he had the smallest room. Since the signing, more troops have been deployed and the rebels and their allies have continued to make territorial advances. Presumably, the commitment by both Uganda and Rwanda to the cease-fire agreement is doubtable. At the present time, Uganda have found a new friend, it is the MLC of Jean Pierre Bemba who controlled the north Equateur provience. The reason: In difference with RCD of Goma, MLC members are Congolese rather composed by Rwandans soldiers or Rwandans origin.
Relations between Rwanda and Uganda have grown increasingly strained since
the RCD split. Soldiers from both countries have been stationed at the airport and control separate parts of the city of Kisangani. Despite recent efforts by South Africa and Zambia to verify leadership claims and to put pressure on both factions to sign, the disagreement degenerated into open urban warfare between the two armies on 14 August 1999. The former allies fought for the control of several installations as well as of the city international airport, employing heavy artillery. On 17 August, Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a cease-fire. They say they will send a military team to find out why the fighting erupted. They also agree that they will respect the outcome of the investigation on leadership claims within the RCD undertaken by the South Africans and the Zambians. If the investigation committee doesn't come up with a clear result, both will recommend that the 28 founders of RCD should sign the agreement.
The Lusaka agreement, however, meets the demands of the rebels and their supporters, and more specifically of the Rwandans by recognising their pledge to disarm the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the Great Lakes region. But the current fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani makes quite clear that the security interests of those countries, which their intervention in the DRC was supposed to protect, are not the only motivation for the war. There are neither Rwandan nor Ugandan rebel groups in Kisangani that could justify the presence of the two countries armies. Instead, the conflict is for commercial influence to control diamond, gold and coffee concessions, and for political influence in the region after the war is over. As the result, for Kabila, the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda also legitimizes his claim that those countries are aggressors, and called on the Security Council to strongly condemn the violations of the cease-fire and to demand the "immediate departure" of forces from Uganda and Rwanda.
Yet, in reality and in my own judgment, the Lusaka peace accord is something more diplomatic rather than practicable. The purpose for each belligerent to sign the accord differs, and the promises of Lusaka accord are enormous. Parties had initial objectives when they entered the war but also developed new ones since. The war economy that has developed in the DRC has created a set of powerful individuals (no one consider him self as a War Lord) and networks that transcend state actors. More and more people have an interest in the continuation of the war, for instance to open the market of DRC which was closed by Kabila, and to exploit the mines. Therefore, it is unlikely the peace will maintain for a long period. Indeed if we look at the post Lusaka situation, the fighting are still going on today. For peace to return to the DRC the international community should support regional efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the DRC and to resolve its security issues.