Current Civil War in DRC

 

In the contemporary world of diplomacy, it is difficult for me, as a student to believe that due to an important external dimension, it would necessarily determine the internal political situation of one sovereign state. For instance, Chairman Mao in the early 1950’s refused the demand from Stalin to build for Russian a naval base located in Arthur Port, or General C. De Gaulle refused the presence of NATO/ US troops deployment in the post WWII French territory. Hence it is only the Democratic Republic of Congo’s weakness that offers irresistible opportunities to external powers to undermine its integrity and sovereignty.

 In fact, African powers could not have influenced politics in the Congo to the extent that they are in the absence of long-standing, deep-seated, internal causes of conflict. Rwanda and Uganda have a national security interest in the DRC, namely and officially to stop the incursions of armed groups based in the Congo-Kinshasa, which I will examine with attention later. However, if Kabila’s new regime, DRC had been a stronger state, the two countries would not have been in a position to invade it twice within a time of a year. Kigali’s ability to export its internal problems to the DRC shows how ineffective the Congolese state has been. Nevertheless, if it is so evident for all sides that Kabila as leader has an enormous difficulty to handle the ensemble new government; this weakness must have a reason. Therefore, we have to study the cause of Kabila’s political weakness in order to explain what was the cause, and to predict what will be the progress in the future as far as the conflict in the Grand Lacks region is concerned.

The country that Kabila took over was in a state of bankruptcy. The debt inherited by Kabila was estimated at around US$ 15.6 billion. At the political level, the new government of Kabila has a problem of legitimacy. Indeed, Kabila has no a solid political base, yet as a new leader, he has no choice but to play the “Strong Man”. This translates by his refusal of rapprochement with the former premier Etienne Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDP), which is considered by many anti Mobutists as the most popular opposition to Mobutu. Yet, on the other hand, it is not totally the error of Kabila because Tshisekedi declared publicly that he would accept nothing lower than the position of Premier. Many Congolese distrust Kabila’s willingness to pursue a national dialogue and share power in a transitional government. Presumably, since the take over of Kinshasa, he has replicated most of Mobutu Sese Seko’s dictatorial and manipulative political tactics, for instance, to imprison the political dissidents such as the case for Tshisekedi.

 The civil war in DRC really start, after the investiture of president Laurent Kabila, when he suddenly announced on July 14 1997, that he was replacing the Rwandan officer, James Kabarehe a tutsi Rwandan, who was the chief-of-staff of Force Congolese Army (FCA), with a native Congolese. Kabarehe’s position had always been a controversial issue, because Rwanda helped Kabila to gain the power, but such an obvious demonstration from Rwanda and Uganda of a continuing influence and manipulation over Kabila and his new government offended nationalist sentiment in the new Congo, especially in the capital, Kinshasa. In reality, Kabila in 18 months from the start of war against Mobutu to the replacement of Kabarehe, never controlled the entire rebellion armed forces as whole. Therefore, Kabila felt in danger, and in order to change his encircled condition, his did not only came out with the “genius” idea of replace James Kabarehe and then invited him to stay on as military adviser to his new successors, Francois Olenga, Edi Kapend and Joseph Kabila, who is in fact Kabila’s proper son (Jeune Afrique 12: 22 1998), but also to use the thousands remain ex- Zaire Force Army as new blood to replace his “Kadogos” (kid soldiers) troops. In lieu of construct a Republican army, Kabila in reality preferred an army composed essentially of Katangaise, which come from Kabila native region. It is possible that Kabila at that time thought he had built up enough domestic support to distance himself from Rwanda, which had clearly lost faith in him. As the result of all these silent tactical movements, two weeks later, the gloves came off. Kabila ordered politely that all the Rwandan troops still in Congo to go home immediately. He thanked them for their help, but he also thanked the Congolese population for having tolerated their presence. Within 24 hours, Rwandan military advisers were being bundled out of the luxurious Kinshasa villas they had taken over from Mobutu's supporters and driven to the airport. Rwanda tried to put a good face on the situation, saying it had requested its troops' return, but an official admitted that the order had come as a surprise (BBC).

The people most alarmed by this development were the Banyamulenge, the remain Congolese tutsis of Rwandan origin (Banyamulenge is now being divided into hutu and tutsi), who are generally seen as foreigners by other Congolese although many of them have lived in Congo for decades. Recall that it was their persecution by other groups in the east of the country that prompted Rwanda to intervene in Congo in 1996: their struggle for survival turned into an uprising against Mobutu. Now, with anti-Rwandans feeling on the rise, they feared for their future again. Five days after the order, Congolese tutsi troops in the eastern town of Goma mutinied, and the uprising against Kabila began. Rwanda and Uganda were rapidly accused of backing it. As a matter of fact, Kigali and Kampala officially gave up Kabila’s regime at August 2 1998.

It looked at first like a re-run of the previous rebellion, but this time the rebels had the advantage of inside knowledge. They quickly captured the main towns in the east - Goma, Bukavu, Uvira and Kisangani too. Then they planned to take the Kinshasa government completely by surprise: the rebels hijacked a plane, filled it with rebel troops and flew it right across the country to the Atlantic coast military base of Kitona, where former colleagues joined the mutiny. Other towns fell in rapid succession. By August 13, 1998 within two weeks of launching their uprising, the rebels had taken the Inga hydro-electric power station, which supplies Kinshasa's electricity, and the river port of Matadi, which provides most of the capital's food imports. But the tide turned again almost as rapidly. From the moment the Banyamulenge mutinied, Kabila, who had never previously bothered to court popular opinion, secured domestic support by whipping up nationalist feeling against them and their cousins in Rwanda. Tutsis in Kinshasa were reportedly attacked in the street and murdered; others were locked up, allegedly for their own safety. Kabila took the same anti-Rwandan, anti-tutsi message abroad in a desperate bid for military assistance: how could other African countries, he asked, allow Rwanda and Uganda to get away with invading Congo and annexing parts of it? And in the nick of time, Zimbabwe and Angola sprang to his aid, followed later by Namibia and Tchad.

 

As the result of this spectacular alliance change, the new figures are:

 

DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tchad and Interhamwes

Vs

Congolese rebels, Uganda, Rwanda and UNITA

 

Angola:

Since 1997, Dos sandos might have been disappointed in Kabila since, but it evidently had no confidence that another leader would do better. Above all it wanted to prevent a complete disintegration of Congo, which would play into UNITA's hands. Presently FAA (Force Army Angolais) has basis in two Congo (Kinshasa/Brazzaville). Few months ago, FAA concentrates about a thousand soldiers and heavy equipment in DRC in the border between two countries. The purpose is still to cut all possible retirement for UNITA of Savimbi. Since august 1998, Angola poured its battle-hardened troops and planes into western Congo, through its Cabinda enclave.

 

Zimbabwe:

Zimbabwe's motives for backing Kabila were less clear. Zimbabwean newspapers speculated that the government was trying to ensure it got paid for large quantities of arms and uniforms it had delivered to Congo. Analysts said President Robert Mugabe had intervened largely to spite President Nelson Mandela of South Africa - who had been quietly appealing for a peaceful compromise - because he felt Mandela had eclipsed him as Africa's leading statesman. Zimbabwe sent nearly three thousand troops plus aircraft to defend Kinshasa, plus the eight thousand in place since September, 1998.

 

Namibia:

President Sam Nujoma has close personal interest in Diamond sector. In the report from RFI-Afrique, 15 December, 1999, in a official meeting with American ambassador to UN, Richard Holebrock, president Nujoma said he will retreat his troop from DRC. There are presently according to Namibian newspapers, two thousand of them stationed in DRC.

           

            Interhamwes:

            Hutu and ex-FAR by interest of survive have to ally with Kabila. When in August, 1998, Uganda and Rwanda chose to gave up Kabila, extremists hutu who are in the north Kivu suddenly discovered a common interest with the old enemy Kabila is to lute against the common aggressors. But the hutus fighters are not only in Kivu province, according to the chief of MLC Jean Pierre Bemba, during June, 1999 when his troop captured the north region of Equateur, they had to battle with militia hutus and force them to take refuge into the Central African Republic side. Kigali accuses DRC and Uganda to train the Interhamwes militias and integrate them into the FAC.

 

Tchad:

Unknown.

 

UNITA:

The alliance of UNITA with other anti Kabila movements is similar to this of hutus. UNTA can find a new refuges and backers in the territory of DRC as the result. In the morning news of RFI-Afrique, 03 December 1999, Kabila accused UNITA to help the MLC to conquer the town of Mbandaka.

 

Rebel successes were rapidly reversed as the Angolans captured Kitona and pursued their opponents from the rear, while the Zimbabweans held the line in the capital. There was a flurry of excitement for several days in late August when the rebels launched a surprise attack on the outskirts of Kinshasa, in an attempt to take the airport. This failed, leaving large numbers of rebels trapped in the west between the Zimbabweans and Angolans. It raised fears that Rwanda and Uganda would step up their

involvement in the war, bringing the foreign forces face to face. But at the Non-Aligned Summit in South Africa in early September, the situation suddenly changed again. Mandela announced without explanation that South Africa now backed the intervention in support of Kabila. Equally astonishingly, the once-combative sounding Mugabe, believing that Kabila's government had been saved, suggested that there was no need to continue the war. He said peace should now be negotiated from this position of strength. He may have been influenced by growing protests at home - or perhaps by American diplomatic efforts to prevent several of Washington's best friends in Africa fighting each other.

During that time and ever since, the general position in the international community is to ask all foreign troops to withdraw so that a space can be created to initiate internal negotiations among the Congolese belligerents. Many such initiatives have failed before the accord of Lusaka because of Kabila's refusal to talk to the rebels.