Dr. Khan’s activity on Nuclear Weapon and its ramification
Research for the President of the United States


“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002



I. Identify the problems and concerned countries

The United States (US) has a long standing commitment to limit, delay or stop and even reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its delivery system. However, the case of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan has made a major blow to US as well as international counterproliferation effort. While we are debating on the finding of WMD in Iraq, and how to prevent the “rogue states” including Iran, Libya and North Korea, and terrorists to get nuclear weapons, Pakistani government for 15 years has been supplying atomic technology to them direct or indirectly. And Islamabad did so even after President Bush repeatedly declared that governments that conducted such transfers could be subject to preemptive attack by the United States.

Story Briefing

Dr. Khan’s nuclear proliferation business ended when on October 2004, centrifuge parts on a cargo on a German ship, the BBC China, sealing toward Libya was intercepted by the Germans and Italians warships, the latter was taken into an Italian port for inspection. It appears that Dr. Khan’s network was penetrated by our intelligence service. George Tenet stated during a speech at Georgetown University, that US intelligence had penetrated Khan’s network, including its subsidiaries, scientists, front companies, agents, finances, and manufacturing plants. Our intelligence agency, therefore, takes credit for the seizure. However the New Yorker magazine revealed that it was the Libyans themselves who told the shipment as part of their peace offering to the West.

The damage caused by Khan’s network is considerable. Overall, to Libya, Iran and North Korea, the Khan’s network supplied components for high-speed gas centrifuges, machines that convert natural uranium to nuclear weapon grade and are very hard to manufacture on one’s own. To Libya, thousands of centrifuge parts were sent from a factory in Malaysia, and other parts and machinery also came from Europe. The Khan network even sold Libya the design for an actual nuclear warhead. Iran and North Korea also may have received the same bomb design; we still don’t know. The official reaction from the Pakistan government is that Khan was a “rogue actor” who abused the autonomy he gained from his earlier patriotic actions to pursue personal goals, Islamabad has nothing to do with it.

After we have invaded Iraq and overthrow its brutal dictator Saddam, Iran allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to inspect its nuclear facilities. The inspection revealed centrifuges and traces of highly enriched uranium, and Iran pinpointed Pakistan as the source. A British expert who recently accompanied agency inspectors into Iran identified Iranian centrifuges as being identical to the Dutch design that Dr. Khan secretly obtained when he was working in Netherlands. Another member of “Axis of Evil”, Libya, at the meantime formally decided to terminate its clandestine WMD programs in October 2003, and made a full disclosure of its efforts to build nuclear weapons;

According to Libya, since the 1990s, Pakistan supplied Libya with almost everything it needed for its nuclear arms program, from centrifuges to on-site training. About $100 million was paid to the nuclear arms network; the transfer only ended only in October 2004. And to North Korea, the Khan network supplied what it needed in the mid and late 1990’s.

Concerned Countries

Iraq
Previous to the first Persian Gulf War, US aid to Pakistan was cut off by President Bush 41. Pakistan was in need for cash. In October 1990, a go between of Pakistani government approached Iraq offering help to build a nuclear weapon. Reports of such alleged attempted deal have circulated since the late 1990s, when UN weapons inspectors discovered Iraqi documents describing a business proposition from a man claiming to represent Khan. The proposal allegedly offered nuclear weapons blueprints and uranium enrichment equipment for an upfront price of $5 million. Khan’s alleged offer was described in an October 1990 memo by Iraq’s intelligence service, the Mukhabarat. According to a UN translation of the document, a man identified as Malik relayed an offer from Khan to help Iraq in making enriched uranium and nuclear weapons. “He is prepared to give us project designs for a nuclear bomb,” the Iraqi memo states, referring to Khan. The Iraqis were initially suspicious, thinking the offer was a scam; nevertheless, Iraqi officials decided to seek samples from the middleman. No such samples were delivered, and the outbreak of war essentially ended Iraq’s nuclear program.

Iran
According to reports by Director General Mohamed El Baradei to the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran received drawings of a centrifuge “through a foreign intermediary” some time “around 1987” after the two countries signed a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes. Additionally, between 1985 and 1997 “about 2000 components and some subassemblies had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but no help was received from abroad in the assembly of centrifuges or in training, nor were any completed centrifuges imported.” Khan sold “disused” Pakistan -1 (P-1) centrifuges and what he describes as outmoded equipment to Iran along with the drawings and technical specifications and possibly components or complete assemblies of the more advanced P-2 model. Initial deliveries were made during the years 1989-1991; but evidence has surfaced that transfers continued as late as 1995.

There are at least two strong reasons to believe Pakistan was a primary source of nuclear technology for Iran.

• First, diverse sources shown that centrifuge drawings acquired by Iran and given to IAEA inspectors resemble the design of the Pakistan-1 centrifuge, an early generation Pakistan centrifuge with aluminum rotors.


• Secondly, and most convincingly, the IAEA discovered assembled centrifuges at the Doshan Tapeh military air base near Tehran, which strongly resembled the Pakistan-2 centrifuge design.


Pakistani investigators believe that some of the shipments from Pakistan to Iran were probably transported over land through a Karachi-based businessman. Other shipments were routed through Dubai.

North Korea
Cooperation with North Korea on nuclear issue started in 1997. While most analysts note Pakistani-North Korean cooperation on ballistic missile technology started as early as 1992, the consensus appears that Pakistan’s transfer of uranium enrichment technology did not occur until 1997.

For the missile cooperation, according to Financial Times, former Premier Minister Benazir Bhutto remembers that “she was persuaded by Pakistani scientists to take a trip to North Korea where she obtained North Korean missile designs. In April 1994, a North Korean foreign ministry delegation traveled to Pakistan.”

As far as the date of Nuclear program transfer from Pakistan to North Korea is concerned, the reason to believe 1997 as the debut is because analysts attribute the Pakistani policy change to the lack of foreign reserves in 1996 to pay for the delivery of the Nodong missile system, or a secret visit by then Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat to Pyongyang in December 1997. Pakistan has admitted that technical assistance was provided after General Pervez Musharraf became Army chief in 1999. US intelligence agencies believe that strategic trade between Pyongyang and Islamabad continued as late as August 2002.
Libya
Cooperation with Libya also supposedly began in 1997. Such cooperation continued until fall 2003 when Tripoli decided to stop its nuclear program. The product sold from Dr. Khan was a complete nuclear weapons program. US officials believe that the principal supplier for the entire Libyan program was Khan. Though there were other suppliers for other elements of the program but Dr. Khan provided the design, the technology, the expertise, and equipment, primarily for the centrifuge. He also provided the warhead design.

Questions

• How Dr. Khan’s network could operate with impunity?

Islamabad contends that Khan was a “rogue actor” who abused the autonomy he gained from his earlier patriotic actions to pursue personal goals. According to Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, the action of a group of scientists of Pakistan headed by Khan in clandestinely selling or transferring military nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea was a rogue operation without the knowledge or approval of the political or military leadership of the country.

The Musharraf regime launched an internal probe to apparently get a clearer picture of the activities of its top nuclear lab and senior scientists. In fall 2003, Pakistani investigators traveled to Iran, Dubai, Vienna, and Libya to investigate US and IAEA complaints against Khan. They discovered that the complaints were borne out by evidence; and more alarmingly, that Khan had apparently made unauthorized deals unbeknown to Islamabad and reaped huge personal financial rewards in the process.

However, is it possible for Dr. Khan to sale secret nuclear materials and information without acknowledgement or participation of senior Pakistani military, intelligence and other government officials? Dr. Khan acknowledged a broad scheme that netted him tens of millions of dollars, where the other fund went?

President Musharraf told the CNN, on March 19, 2004, that: “I am extremely positive neither the government nor the military was involved. The Pakistan government had carried out investigations into the episode and concluded that it was these individuals who carried out the proliferation of nuclear technology.” If Musharraf’s claim that Dr Khan’s activities were unofficial is to be believed, then he and his government are open to charges of incompetence in safeguarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

President Musharraf is not wholly above suspicion himself in this affair; before taking the fall in exchange for a pardon, Dr Khan suggested the General and other senior members of the military knew what was going on, at least in respect of missile barter deals with North Korea. After received the pardon form the President Musharraf, Dr. Khan denied any president’s involvement. Which is it?

• Is the ISI involved?

Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) is the heart of Pakistan’s nuclear establishment, it was so secret even civilian prime ministers were not allowed to visit. KRL was under the strict control and supervision of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. How the ISI could not be aware of Khan’s activities?

In 2001, a US spy satellite photographed a Pakistani C-130 at Pyongyang airport in North Korea as it loaded missiles for Pakistan. These missiles were exchanged for nuclear weapons technology. ISI was in charge of the entire operation. According to diverse documents, Khan made dozens of trips to North Korea, to Dubai and Africa, and met with Libyan and Iranian nuclear scientists. He also conducted similar meetings in Casablanca, Morocco, and Istanbul, Turkey. Anyone who knows anything about Pakistan’s ultra-secret nuclear activities also knows these activities could not have taken place without the full knowledge and approval of ISI. Therefore, known for their anti-American sentiments, people from KRL and ISI might worked together to proliferate Pakistani know how of nuclear bomb in order to weaken American world preeminence.

• Rationale behind Khan’s deed

There are three reasons to explain his action:
A. This is an assignment from the top Pakistani leadership since US aid assistance was discontinued in the early 1990s. To sell its nuclear know how in exchange for financial surplus to finance Pakistan military budget.

• Khan made nuclear transfers to Iran under the rubric of a secret peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that the two countries signed in the mid-1980s. The historical record shows that former Pakistani president, the late General Zia-ul-Haq, was aware of Iran’s interest in purchasing Pakistani enrichment technology that would enable it to enrich uranium to weapons grade.


• Retired General Beg, who succeeded Zia, mentioned that Khan informed him about the equipment sales to Iran in order to finance Pakistan’s defense budget. However, Beg insists that Khan had assured him that the equipment being sold was outmoded, old, and disused, and would not enable Tehran to enrich uranium in the near term.


• Two former cabinet ministers in the first Nawaz Sharif government (1990-1993), Senator Ishaq Dar and Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan have stated that in 1991 former Chief of Army Staff General Beg lobbied Sharif for the transfer of nuclear technology to a “friendly state,” for the sum of $12 billion. However, Sharif, rejected Beg’s proposal.


B. Dr. Khan public stated that to sell nuclear program is to strengthen the Muslim world, and divert Western attention and pressure from the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. This claim justified his deed toward Iran.

C. Dr. Khan received lucrative cut from selling Pakistani nuclear technology, but Khan and his associates abused such privilege by making unauthorized sales of goods and services and reap huge personal financial rewards in the process. Sells made to secular states North Korea and Libya back such view.

It is important to note that during the civilian reign, the premier ministers strictly prohibited nuclear transfer, and the transfer occurred only during military control.

• Is it possible that terrorist obtained the bomb?

Unfortunately, by the time we realize that terrorists have obtained nuclear bomb, uncountable innocent people would perished already. The public confession of Dr. Khan augurs only to a worsen scenario. Did he tell everything? Beside of the “Aix of Evil,” is there any terror organizations, including Al Qaeda got nuclear materials from him that can be used to attack American soil?

What we know so far is that two Pakistani nuclear scientists under AQK’s orders journeyed to Kandahar, Afghanistan, shortly before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to confer with Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden. Shortly after Operation Enduring Freedom toppled the Taliban regime, one of Mullah Omar’s messages warned of an event that would soon hit the US “so terrible that it defies description.” Some intelligence analysts relate Omar’s statement to the visit of the two Pakistani scientists before the US attack who presumably told their interlocutors how to assemble a “dirty bomb,” or a blend of conventional explosives with radioactive materials.

After the liberation of Kabul and Kandahar, the CIA submitted to Mr. Musharraf a list of a half-dozen nuclear scientists it wanted probed for al Qaeda links. The two who had visited Kandahar before September 11, Suleiman Asad and Muhammad Ali Muktar, suddenly were working in Burma on undisclosed research, and therefore unavailable. Currently, no information on the follow up is available.

• Where is the US intelligence failure?

The obvious success of this nuclear network demonstrates the failure of the United States’ security apparatus. As professor Milhollin of Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control asserted, the failure to close down or even to detect this nuclear arms bazaar is, without exaggeration, one of the great national security disasters of our time. For, three of America’s most resolute enemies got much of what they needed to make nuclear weapon material, and we didn’t know about it. North Korea, Iran and Libya, are long time supporters of terrorist organizations.

• Libya is on US intelligence watch list since decades, we are working at all fronts to isolate and prevent our foe - Col. Gadafy to become nuclear capable. However, it is only when the latter voluntarily come forward as part of his peace offering to the United States that we become award of Libya nuclear capacity.


• As for North Korea, US diplomats only confronted Pyongyang over its centrifuge imports in 2002, several years after Dr. Khan sold to North Korean what it wanted.


• Iran’s centrifuge factory didn’t become a public issue until the Iranian resistance publicized it in August 2002. And the world realized Dr. Khan’s deal with Iran only after the latter allowed the IAEA to inspect its facilities.


In many aspects, this is an international failure on WMD counterproliferation, but it is first of all an American failure because we are the target of “rogue states” and terror organizations. Therefore, it is legitimate for one to ask why US intelligence failed to expose such incredibly dangerous nukes for cash business on time?

• Miscorrelation

It is obvious that our intelligence service had information, but it failed to correlate the facts. One may assert that it is always difficult to collect intelligence, especially on a closed and highly secretive organization such as Al Qaeda. However, Dr. Khan and its organization were not in that category. Dr. Khan is known as the father of Islamic Bomb, his political Islamic opinion is well known. And proliferation activity of Pakistan is no secret to the world! In addition, the free trade zone in Dubai, where components were transferred, is a world known place for illegal military technology trafficking. Furthermore, different sources suggest that western diplomats and officials while visiting Pakistan had admonished the Pakistanis government about Dr. Khan’s activities. However, neither the Pakistanis nor Westerners continued the probe on Dr. Khan.

• Failure at the systemic level

We need to shine a light on the underlying problems that led to such humiliating intelligence failure. De facto, for 50 years, the CIA and other intelligence agencies are accustomed to a Cold War oriented thinking. Though sophisticate, our Cold War based bureaucratic counterproliferation procedures are not geared accurately toward 21st century oriented international black market and people like Khan.

We need to prove to the world that the American system works. Should we are determinate to stop any proliferation activities and smuggling networks before they succeed, we must change the reigning bureaucratic culture and modus operandi in the US intelligence community; we need to increase our preventive measures against any future Dr. Khan “wanna be.” Washington should also restructure our surveillance system especially in the counterproliferation domain. We must develop a more effective counterproliferation team, strengthening joint operations and exploit the US information advantage in order to answer the criminal activities of “rogue states” and terror organizations.



• Priority shift

However, it is reasonable to assert that the invasion of Iraq and war against Al Qaeda have drawn considerable intelligence resources away from traditional WMD arms control activity; and since Washington’s political priority shifted, Pakistan and its nuclear proliferation had lesser importance that Pakistan cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

II. Describe the current problem with Pakistan

Our problem with Pakistan is about a dilemma of national interests; between long term oriented arms control objective and short term oriented realpolitik based agenda. The United States of America has renewed its interests on Pakistan after the September 11th tragedy. Yet, our strategic ally in the war against terrorism, Pakistan, is proliferating the nuclear known how to our foes. The reason is mainly economics and the United States is partly responsible.

• We have cut off our aid to Pakistan after the Cold War ended. As the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan, President Bush and his advisors decided to end US assistance to Pakistan because the latter no longer represents US national interests. Such utilitarian policy caused Pakistan to plunge into economic disaster. Subsequently, the civilian government faced challenges from both military as well as religious groups, and subsequently was remove from power by the military. Due to lack of financial wherewithal, Pakistan military Juntas decided to sell the out dated nuclear technology to whom ever is willing to pay the price in order to finance its deficit.


• When India and Pakistan tested nuclear bombs, the US government imposed sanctions on both countries, which further increased Pakistani hardship. The anti American voice grow further, extremists at the elite level see the proliferation as both economically beneficial and strategic retaliation against the US.


Currently, the military Juntas of Pakistan under the leadership of President Musharraf took a tremendous risk for being allying with Washington in the war against terrorism. For that reason, the United States has awarded Pakistan with considerable military, financial and material aids. However, after our administration repeated declarations on WMD counterproliferation issue, Pakistan has not stopped its nuclear technology for cash business utile Libya sold out Pakistan. As far as the main protagonist – Dr. A.Q. Khan and his counterparts are concerned, although the government of Pakistan has now arrested involved scientists, is interrogating them along with other network’s members, as well as promised to share all learned information about the network, and assured us that this will never happen again. Nevertheless, efforts and level of cooperation from Pakistani government so far has been inadequate with respect to the gravity of the situation.

• President Musharraf refused to open Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to international inspection. The government of Pakistan has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.


• The Pakistani government stated publicly that Dr. Khan affair is an internal issue, no foreign interrogation is allowed.


• Given the nature of Musharraf’s regime – a Military Juntas, in addition to lack of political transparency as well as previous hypocritical talks, there is no reason to believe Pakistan will stop its nuclear proliferation business.


III. Current US policy on Pakistan with respect to counterproliferation

The revelations on Dr. Khan’s network have, however, confronted the US with two distinct problems, a classic Scylla and Charybdis situation. US interests in maintaining the current pro-US Pakistani government and Pakistani’s nuclear proliferation to American lethal enemies. The current administration clearly gives the priority of counterterrorism over counterproliferation policy, however.

In terms of counterproliferation policy, the United States government has emphasized the problem of WMD to the world community at different occasions. The President has repeatedly said that we must deal with spread of WMD, including nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. On the ground, we are working with allies and friends, confronting “rogue states” that develop deadly weapons. We have demonstrated our willingness to use different means, including diplomatic negotiation, economic sanction, international treaties and military force. President Bush has confirmed our readiness to commit more resources in support of the Administration’s overall non-proliferation strategy, for instance we have invaded Iraq, persuaded Libya to stop its nuclear project, and negotiating with North Korea.

Regarding Pakistan, our administration has dealt carefully with its military government’s links with the Khan’s network with respect to Pakistanis crucial role in our war against Al Qaeda. As a result, the administration’s public reaction has been so far fainthearted vis-à-vis to our declared position toward proliferators. For instance, questioned by Congress about whether there was evidence that General Musharraf was complicit in nuclear sales by Dr. Khan’s network to Iran, Libya and North Korea, the undersecretary of State, Mr. Bolton said for instance, that while General Musharraf might have been aware of such sales, he might have been politically unable to stop them due to Dr. Khan symbolic importance in Pakistan. Indeed, the popularity of Khan in Pakistan is extremely high.

However, we might pass out a wrong signal because of our non-hawkish, soft and nonchalant approach. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said “We value the commitments Mr. Musharraf has made to prevent the expertise in Pakistan from reaching other places … We think that Pakistan is taking serious efforts to end the activities of a dangerous network.” As for the pardon of Mr. Khan “I don’t think it’s a matter for the United States to sit in judgment on.” Given the fact that Pakistan is probably the worst criminal in the history of nuclear weapons proliferation, Washington’s feeble reaction is viewed by others as inadequate with respect to the gravity of the affair. Then again, what other options are available?

V. Why our soft approach toward Pakistan is inconsistence with our WMD counterproliferation policy
In regard to WMD proliferation, from a historical perspective, the US government lacked a true long-term oriented arms control strategy to check the threat from WMD proliferation, and often, nonproliferation commitment had been compromised by short term oriented US foreign policy. Again, the case of Pakistan confirms this assertion.

In 2002, White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer was asked if Washington would punish countries that provided assistance to North Korea on the enrichment program? He responded, “September 11th changed the world.” Subsequently, antebellum to invasion of Iraq, the United States intercepted North Korean’s secret missile transfer to Yemen, but allowed Yemen to receive Scud missile from North Korea, and only imposed sanctions on North Korea. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher explained that “because of the commitments that they [Yemenis] had made and in consideration of their support for the war on terrorism.” With Pakistan too, we were too passive. Though we, before Oct 2003, admonished President Musharraf about Dr. Khan’s fishy proliferation activity, such as by the Deputy Undersecretary of State Armitage, without compunction, Islamabad remained inactive until the shipment to Libya was stopped.

We cannot have a double standard policy on biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. Counterproliferation is a serious business, and an effective Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control Policy must be kept consistent. President Bush has repeatedly said that his first mission as president is to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and the regimes that sponsor them. His national security doctrine states that even preemptive military action is justified in order to stop it. Yet now that Pakistan’s regime has been caught making such transfers, our administration is seemingly accepting its implausible alibi, allow the very generals who oversaw the traffic to investigate it, and trust that they won’t do it again. We have even award Pakistan military with the major non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military ally status, which will facilitate Pakistan’s acquisition of military hardware and other technologies that were not available to it before.

It is important to maintain a strong tie with Pakistan, a soft approach, however, can be counterproductive. Iran and North Korea, which are facing US demands for international inspections and the threat of a referral to the UN Security Council, may take comfort from our weak measures taken on Pakistan.

Therefore, we need to have a new policy concerning proliferation from Pakistan. On the other words, we need to use both carrots and sticks. Publicly, it is time to have a tougher approach because not only it has abused our trust and humiliated Washington, in addition, Islamabad continue to refuse the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities and to allow the US to interrogate Dr. Khan at our embassy in Islamabad.

Privately, it is critical to warn President Musharraf that:

• Anti-American sentiment in Pakistani army as well as ISI is a one of our biggest concerns.
• The fact that President Musharraf is supporting native Islamists groups to consolidate his power is unconstructive toward US-Pakistani relation.
• Regarding Pakistan nuclear technology, the government should train more reliable personnel, and enhance the safety and security of its nuclear warheads, fissile materials, and sensitive nuclear facilities.
• And most crucially, it is important to see the return of a civilian government in Islamabad.
• We must assure President Musharraf that he can count on American support, but he cannot take such support for granted.


Our double standard behavior is undermining our WMD arms control policy. There is a consensus among world democracies that proliferation of WMD cannot be tolerated. World democracies have demonstrated their willingness to engage with us in that combat. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into respected actions. Given our international leadership position, and the gravity of WMD threat and consequence to the American soil, especially if it is used by the terrorists; we must not undermine our counterproliferation policy and efforts because our interests on Yemen or Pakistan.


VI. Our contingency plan, and the future of WMD counterproliferation

With respect to counterproliferation policy, different countries require different strategies; the problem of Pakistani proliferation cannot be solved instantaneously, but it can be managed gradually. Overall, our main response so far has been to focus on closing down Khan’s covert nuclear network, minimize the damage and most importantly, implementing new policies.

• Sanction against Pakistan

Some suggested sanction; however, under current circumstance sanction against Pakistan is unhelpful. The United States need Pakistani assistance in terms of roll up Dr. Khan’s black market and assistance on war against Taliban and Al Qaeda. Sanction will inevitably destabilize Musharraf’s illegitimate regime. Therefore, sanction against Pakistan is counterproductive. In addition, sanction against other involved countries, including North Korea, Libya and Iran is also irrelevant. According to Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, receiving a nuclear weapons design is a trigger for cutting off aid. However, new sanctions would add little effects on the above states because they do not receive US aid, and by virtue of their status as state sponsors of terrorism.

• Continue to work with Pakistan

There is no need to condemn Pakistan publicly. The last thing we need is a crumbling Musharraf regime. Multiple US national security interests intersect in Pakistan: continued cooperation with the war on terror, stability in the Asian Sub-Continent and nonproliferation. Both Islamabad and Washington clearly aware that we must continue to work together to close down definitely the Khan network, to secure Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, to improve personnel reliability programs for its nuclear scientists.

• What Islamabad need to do

Our aid to Pakistan is critical to Musharraf’s regime; the Bush administration has proposed a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan over the next five years. Therefore, at a minimum, the United States should condition this aid on requiring Pakistan to give the United States full access to Khan, as well as to improve transparency, export controls, and personnel reliability in its nuclear program. Another objectives should be to launch IAEA based international inspections at Pakistani facilities and to draw Pakistan into a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Pakistan has said it will support an FMCT.

• Continue the forward policy on proliferation

On February 11, 2004, Bush at National Defense University reviled his new proposal. The President proposed to expand interdiction efforts (under the Proliferation Security Initiative) to shut down labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets; criminalize proliferation through a new US sponsored UN Security Council resolution; expand cooperative threat reduction measures to states such as Libya; ban enrichment and reprocessing capabilities beyond those states that already have them; make the Additional Protocol (to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) a prerequisite for nuclear-related imports; and create a special committee at the IAEA to investigate compliance.

The new proposal of the President is concurrent with administration’s forward policy on counterproliferation of biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. The forward policy is an important doctrine, for precisely it deals with the fast changing world and its presented challenges. In comparison with the traditional non-proliferation policy, the new doctrine is more than just preventive, it is also aiming at to eliminate or “roll back” of WMD from “rogue states” and terrorist groups that process them or are close to doing so. Counterproliferation policy views the spread of WMD as inevitable, and our objective being stopping WMD proliferation by both traditional and non-traditional means.

• Undersecretary Bolton, during his testimony before the House International Relations Committee on June 4, 2003, laid out four techniques: diplomacy, economic sanctions, interdiction, credible export control and seizure. President Bush also suggested that preemptive military engagement would be used if it is necessary.


• The principal objectives being: dissuading nations from proliferating, encouraging hostile regimes to give way to more peaceable ones, keeping our friends secure, and strengthening international support of strict standards of non-proliferation.


• Furthermore, in addition to the Proliferation Security Initiative, President Bush has also signed executive order establishes an independent and bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding WMD.


• Abandoning Nonproliferation Treaty

International treaties on non-proliferation such as NPT have an importance, but they have considerable flaws and loopholes as well. International treaties are made upon signatories’ consensus with a limited objective. Therefore, it is natural they failed to anticipate or to estimate violation, which they were not designed to address. As a result, regarding to nuclear proliferation, the US and IAEA often react based on incriminating evidence of proliferation after proliferation has occurred. In addition, treaties such as NPT allow signatories to trade on nuclear materials. For instance, Malaysia and the Arab United Emirates, members of NPT were legally to ship centrifuge parts to other treaty members such as Libya or Iran without imposing any restrictions. We also assume that any fissile material that exists inside a treaty member’s borders will be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Of course, both Libya and Iran made fissile material with imported equipment without telling the Agency. The lack of control on exports among treaty members is a large loophole that needs to be closed. International treaties fail to work also because the United States and its friends might threaten to sanction proliferatiors for violating the agreement, but often did not follow through as the liberal democracies world often inclined to make money than to jeopardize relations with countries such as China and Russia. Hence, as NPT is a 30 years old treaty, which unable to follow the fast changing world, in addition to its flaws and loopholes, we are unwilling to use sanction. So what the point to have NPT?
Undoubtedly, the international community is confronted with the growing failure of non-proliferation norms and supplier cartels to restrain proliferation. Second hand proliferation and the globalization of manufacturing - have seriously weakened the ability of 1970s-era non-proliferation regimes to contain twenty-first century problems. If we are really serious about counterproliferation, we shall abandon NPT and guide its signatories to a new and tougher treaty and be willing to use means such as sanction.

• Shutting down the Supermarket

Another step would be for the United States to crack down on retransfer points such as the United Arab Emirates. Unfortunately, Emirates, one American ally at the heart of the scandal, despite its role as the key transfer point in Dr. Khan’s atomic bazaar, escaped from criticism. We cannot worry only about rogue regimes without also shutting down the places that allow them to buy what they want. Next to Dubai’s main port is the Jebel Ali free trade zone, a haven for freewheeling international companies. Experts estimate that it has a handful business shops from rogue regimes like Syria and North Korea. So, the United States and the international community have to put pressure on the countries such as United Arab Emirates or Malaysia that allow dangerous trade to flourish, even withholding aid and refusing arms sales.


• Export Control

The first lesson is that these smuggling networks must be stopped before they succeed. This one wasn’t. Dr. Khan’s network defeated international and US counterproliferation system, notably the export control system. As Gary Milhollin rightly pointed out, “It defeated our export control system like the German army defeated the Maginot line – by simply going around it”. Nonetheless, according to experts, export control system has a vital function. The system effectively slow down countries that want to make WMD, it make their weapon system more expensive, and it provides time for diplomacy to delivery. As a result of export control system, proliferators and buyers are being forced to use the smuggling network.

VII. Recommendations

A consistent policy
Our policy of double standard is not easing rogues states, organizations and individuals to buy or sell biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. Therefore, our politics of combining counterproliferation with double standard foreign policy is far away from the dangerous reality. Moreover, our counterproliferation goal must set to a higher level, because implementing a failing strategy against non democratic proliferators only produces more disappointment or defeat. Our strategy being to slow down and even stop our foe’s weapon development plans through disruption on their procurement attempts. To make the competitor to spend far more time and money or other key resources to respond to our move than we need to respond to theirs. So far, the reactions from Iran and Libya prove our forward policy on proliferation is working effectively. However, the way Washington deals with Pakistan, the worst proliferators in history of counterproliferation is questionable, making our allies and foes alike questioning the consistency of our counterproliferation policy. For instance, one can argue that now the bad proliferation behavior is rewarded with further US military technology transfer.

A tougher policy
The free world should use its leverage such as financial dexterity, military force and market economy against proliferators’ weaknesses. Example, threatening China, Russia or Pakistan with economic consequence and greater political pressure on their human rights record. Explore various methods of applying a competitive strategies approach to the pursuit of nonproliferation objective.

Total prohibition
Absolute interdiction on the development of any nuclear technology worldwide.

Reinforce treaties
Close all loopholes in the nuclear nonproliferation treaties that allow states to pursue WMD under the false cloak of legitimacy. In the past, the United States and its friend have pleaded with each proliferators to join or adherer to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Military Fissile Production Cut Off, only to discover that the value of such pledges is, at best, nominal.

Maintaining IAEA
Not abandoning traditional regulatory organism such as IAEA. Because as a verification body, it still has an important international relevance.

Look for the next A.Q. Khan
The next Dr. Khan can be bioweaponner or chemist. The diffusion of dangerous weapons of mass destruction is no longer about precisely tooled metal parts; it is about what people know and who they know. Meanwhile, denying technology to developing nations is strategically and morally unjustified. So the international intelligent community can only look actively for the next Dr. Khan wanna be.

Talk with potential proliferators
Iran’s and Libya’s revelations about their Pakistani connection are also likely to have a sobering effect on other proliferators in the international system. Proliferator states, rogue entities, scientists, engineers, manufacturers and suppliers can no longer feel assured that their identities will be protected by client states. Through “Gunboat Diplomacy,” we will minimize other future proliferation occurrence.

Better Intelligence Service
The United States, the free world and the International Atomic Energy Agency will have to use all means of intelligence, from satellites overhead to spies on the ground, to do a better job of ensuring that no more nuclear secrets leave Pakistan.

Prepare for the worst
In the end, the battle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may be unwinnable. The assessment based on the current situation is that the technology is out of the Pandora Box, we can’t stop it from spreading. Soon or later, WMD attack would occur some where on this planet. A gradual reorientation of strategies towards consequence management (public health surge capacity, vaccine research, missile defenses) may be necessary in the long term. Accepting this fact, however, does not mean giving up on proven strategies for nonproliferation and threat reduction. Cooperative threat reduction programs still represent the cheapest and easiest way to alleviate many of these dangers, even if they have sometimes been flawed in their execution.